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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN HEALTH ECONOMICS

Benjamin Chartock

Abby Alpert

This dissertation is comprised of essays on the role of information in health economics. In
the rst chapter, I study quality ratings.

Ratings provide consumers with useful quality

information, however, when ratings shift demand to highly-rated sellers, congestion might
occur at the top of the quality distribution. Congestion caused by disclosure may be observed
in the health care setting, where prices often cannot adjust to reect varying quality. I study
the trade-o between providing quality information for consumers and congestion using a
star rating disclosure policy implemented at a large integrated health system in the United
States, which requires every physician to have star ratings posted online in a standardized
fashion. I identify the eects of physician star ratings on patient volume using a regression
discontinuity and dierence-in-discontinuity design which leverages the rounding of ratings
to discrete values and the fact that I observe ratings before and after their public disclosure
online. I nd that an increase in a physician's rating increases the number of new patients
seen by 2.96 visits per month on a baseline of 5.48 (54% increase). I show that star ratings
shift patients to physicians who more often provide medically recommended screenings,
counseling, and vaccinations.

However, I also show that a higher rating causes patients

to wait longer for treatment. New patients wait 2.7 additional days (30.5% longer) for an
additional increment of the rating scale and existing patients wait longer as well.

I use

these ndings to compute a revealed-preference estimate of the shadow price of a star;
I nd that patients are willing to wait 3 additional days in exchange for a one standard
deviation increase in physician ratings. In the absence of a price, wait times may serve as
an equilibrating factor to clear the market. In the second chapter, I study surprise medical
bills.

I introduce a model of nal-oer arbitration over these bills between insurers and

vi

providers which highlights the tradeos for rms and policymakers.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

ABSTRACT

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vi

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

x

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER 1 :

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Quality Disclosure, Demand, and Congestion:

xi

Evidence

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

1.2

Related Literature

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

1.3

Rationing Demand by Wait List: A Theoretical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

1.4

Institutional Setting and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20

1.5

Empirical Strategy

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

1.6

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

1.7

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

1.8

Tables & Figures

53

from Physician Ratings

CHAPTER 2 :

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Surprise, Out-of-Network Medical Bills and Arbitration:
An Economic Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

72

2.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

72

2.2

Model

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

2.3

Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

2.4

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80

viii

BIBLIOGRAPHY

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix

93

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 1.1

Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53

TABLE 1.2

Outcome: Monthly New Visits (OLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

54

TABLE 1.3

Monthly New Visits - Family Medicine

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

54

TABLE 1.4

Dierence-in-Discontinuities

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55

TABLE 1.5

Monthly New Visits - By Leading 5 Specialties . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

TABLE 1.6

Monthly New Visits - By Patient Age Groups

57

TABLE 1.7

Monthly New Visits - By Patient Health Status

. . . . . . . . . . . .

58

TABLE 1.8

Monthly New Visits - By Provider Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

TABLE 1.9

Monlthy New Visits, by Geographic Density of Family Medicine

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

TABLE 1.10 Wait Days for Appointment, New Patients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

TABLE 1.11 Wait Days for Appointment, Established Patients . . . . . . . . . . .

62

TABLE 1.12 Wait Days for Urgent Conditions

63

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TABLE 1.13 Monthly New Visits - Observations Restriction to Specied Distance
from Cuto

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

64

TABLE 1.14 Monthly New Visits - Family Medicine: Eect of Weighting by Rating Count

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

x

65

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
FIGURE 1.1

Distribution of Provider Average Ratings

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

FIGURE 1.2

Intuition of Identication Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

FIGURE 1.3

Demand Response to Quality Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

FIGURE 1.4

Demand Response to Quality Disclosure, Dierence in Discontinuities 68

FIGURE 1.5

Relationship Between Star Ratings and Health Quality Metrics . . .

69

FIGURE 1.6

Market Expansion vs. Switching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

FIGURE 1.7

Eects by Bandwidth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

xi

CHAPTER 1

Quality Disclosure, Demand, and Congestion: Evidence from
Physician Ratings

Ratings provide consumers with useful quality information, however, when ratings shift
demand to highly-rated sellers, congestion might occur at the top of the quality distribution.
Congestion caused by disclosure may be observed in the health care setting, where prices
often cannot adjust to reect varying quality. I study the trade-o between providing quality
information for consumers and congestion using a star rating disclosure policy implemented
at a large integrated health system in the United States, which requires every physician to
have star ratings posted online in a standardized fashion. I identify the eects of physician
star ratings on patient volume using a regression discontinuity and dierence-in-discontinuity
design which leverages the rounding of ratings to discrete values and the fact that I observe
ratings before and after their public disclosure online. I nd that an increase in a physician's
rating increases the number of new patients seen by 2.96 visits per month on a baseline of
5.48 (54% increase). I show that star ratings shift patients to physicians who more often
provide medically recommended screenings, counseling, and vaccinations. However, I also
show that a higher rating causes patients to wait longer for treatment. New patients wait 2.7
additional days (30.5% longer) for an additional increment of the rating scale and existing
patients wait longer as well. I use these ndings to compute a revealed-preference estimate
of the shadow price of a star; I nd that patients are willing to wait 3 additional days
in exchange for a one standard deviation increase in physician ratings. In the absence of a
price, wait times may serve as an equilibrating factor to clear the market.

1
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1.1. Introduction
Quality disclosure can have a profound impact on market outcomes.

On the one hand,

quality disclosure has been shown to enhance welfare by increasing demand for high-quality
products, stimulating competition, and ameliorating adverse selection (Jin and Leslie, 2003).
On the other hand, disclosure might lead to unintended consequences, such as causing
multitasking problems (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Feng Lu 2012) or inducing inecient
eort on the part of suppliers (Dranove et al., 2003). Although the literature has numerous
studies about the eect of quality disclosure on market outcomes, one understudied domain
is the impact of quality disclosure on markets with potential congestion eects and wait
times. If quality ratings sort consumers to highly rated sellers whose supply is not perfectly
elastic, a glut of buyers may seek to purchase from these high-rated sellers if prices cannot
adjust to reect varying quality. One market where this might occur is in health care, where
patients often pay the same price for care from any in-network provider regardless of quality.
In the absence of a price, wait times may serve as an equilibrating factor to clear the market.

I study this phenomenon in the market for family medicine physicians.

This market is

a setting where quality ratings are widespread (e.g., ZocDoc.com and Healthgrades.com)
and where many consumers search the internet for information before selecting a provider.
According to a 2019 University of Michigan National Poll on Healthy Aging, 43% of adults
aged 50-80 reported looking at doctor ratings online (Hanauer et al., 2020).

While the

market for doctors and other medical providers is not the only setting where star ratings are
important (other examples are Amazon for retail products, Yelp for restaurants, or Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services [CMS] Compare for nursing homes), ratings may be
particularly relevant in the market for family medicine and primary care because patients
typically have a large number of potential providers to choose from and their insurance
benets often force an active choice of a family doctor.

This directly contrasts with the

choice of a specialist (e.g., cardiologist), where choice sets are often more limited and another
factorreferralsmight crowd out the role of consumer-facing quality information such as

2

star ratings.

In this paper, I focus on three primary economic outcomes: quantity demanded, sorting
over quality, and congestion spillovers. These three outcomes encompass a range of possible
eects of quality disclosure in equilibrium.

I study these eects using a novel data set

comprised of a combination of electronic health records (EHRs) and the universe of online
doctor reviews that was collected and later disclosed by a large, integrated health system in
the United States with more than 40 hospitals and nearly 1,500 employed physicians.

I use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal eects of an increase in provider
rating on new patient visits which leverages the fact that actual provider quality ratings are
continuous but are rounded into discrete bins on the health system website. In the spirit
of Anderson and Magruder (2012), I exploit the rounding of online ratings, focusing on
doctors just above and just below the rounding thresholdsthese physicians have nearly
identical underlying scores but dierent displayed scores. Additionally, and uniquely among
papers in the literature that examine the demand response to ratings data, I exploit the
fact that the health system collected ratings long before it ever decided to disclose them
to the public. Using this distinctive pre- and post-disclosure variation in the information
available to consumers, I estimate a dierence-in-discontinuities model to capture the eects
of quality disclosure.

This health system and the quality disclosure policy that I study have a number of unique
attributes that make the setting an ideal laboratory for exploring the impact of ratings.
First, the disclosed ratings are highly salient for consumers in this market. Prominent star
ratings for doctors are available in a standardized format and are centrally located on each
provider's website (an example is found in Appendix Figure A1). In addition, the manner
in which ratings are gathered from patients diers from other well-known online sources so
these ratings may be of higher delity than other star ratings.

Ratings disclosed by this

health system are calculated from randomly-sent, post-visit surveys that are designed and
implemented in consultation with the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).
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In contrast to this standardized survey, any person (patient or not) is able to submit a review
of a provider on Yelp or other sites. The random sending of surveys to patients eliminates
much of the selection bias that arises due to which individuals are contributing to online
ratings.

There is also relatively low availability of other sources of online quality data

about medical providers (e.g., from HealthGrades, Zocdoc, and Yelp) in the health system's
region, which suggests that this quality disclosure represents a major source of information
about providers. Lastly, unlike on other websites, these quality scores apply universally to
all providers; no provider can opt out of having their rating disclosed or pay for a more
prominent placement.

The unique data source is also an advantage of this setting because it allows me to focus
directly on the subset of the population most impacted by star ratings: new patients. Using
the EHR data, I can identify which patients in the health care system have never before
visited a given provider, allowing me to focus directly on the subset of shoppers who are
actively searching for physicians but have not yet received a signal via previous consumption.

I use the EHR data to construct a volume measure of new patients at the level of

a providermonth, which allows me to zoom in directly on the component of health care
shopping that might be most impacted by quality disclosure. These data also allow me to
explore heterogeneity in the eect of quality disclosure across dierent provider specialties.
This approach is important due to the nature of insurance design.

Plans such as health

maintenance organizations (HMOs) frequently force members to make active choices about
their family medicine providers. These chosen primary care doctors act as gatekeepers via
referrals to specialists. Accordingly, I focus on family medicine as the subset of providers
who might be most impacted by quality disclosure, but also analyze the eects separately
for dierent types of specialists.

There are several interesting results. First, I nd that consumer demand is highly responsive
to online digital disclosure of quality scores.

In particular, I nd that an increase of one

interval in the rating scale in a provider's online prole causes them to see 54% more new
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patients per month (2.96 new patients). This result is consistent with a number of other
studies about the demand response to online disclosure of ratings (Chevalier and Mayzlin
2006; Anderson and Magruder 2012; Hunter 2020).
larger in magnitude.

However, I obtain estimates that are

This can likely be explained by the standardized nature of quality

disclosure in this setting and potentially by the paucity of other reputable sources of physician quality information. Second, I nd that the eect of quality disclosure is concentrated
among family medicine providers (as opposed to other specialties), highlighting the role of
referrals in consumer choice of specialist providers.

Family medicine doctors are selected

from a large choice set relative to other specialists, and it is not surprising that the eects of
quality disclosure are large for these gatekeepers of patient health. I also nd that the eect
of quality disclosure is greatest among the younger population (ages 18-34) as compared to
older individuals, potentially because this age group is more accustomed to searching online about product quality more generally. Previous literature has been unable to examine
heterogeneity in ratings eect by age.

In addition to these ndings about the demand response to quality disclosure, I provide
evidence on equilibrium eects. Specically, I examine equilibrium consequences of disclosure on supply and demand by studying three dimensions of sorting: (1) examining whether
information disclosure shifts patients to physicians who supply greater inputs to health,
(2) studying whether information disclosure results in market expansion (new patients to
the system) or switching (reallocation of existing patients), and (3) investigating whether
quality disclosure causes congestion at high-quality sellers.

I rst examine whether information shifts patients to physicians who supply greater inputs to health. One common criticism of online disclosure of doctor quality ratings is that
stars do not reect actual provider quality but instead reect orthogonal concerns such as
the quality of the magazines in the waiting room lobby.

In contrast to these concerns, I

show evidence that the online disclosure sorts patients to providers who more frequently
perform medically-recommended inputs to patient health such as vaccinations, screenings,
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and behavioral health services. Second, I study whether the quality disclosure has market
expansion eects or switches existing patients (or both). I nd that the quality disclosure
largely switches current patients at the health system to higher-rated providers rather than
aecting choices of individuals who have never before visited the system, thus suggesting
the main margin of action is that disclosure eects established patients in the system.

Finally, I address a previously understudied question about congestion and wait time that
is relevant in markets such as health care where prices cannot easily adjust in response to
quality scores being released. In contrast to restaurants, for example, which can raise prices
in response to an increase in consumer demand, physicians employed by a health system
cannot immediately raise prices after receiving a high score (or cannot lower prices after
receiving a low score). In this health system, the patient pays the same out-of-pocket price
for family medicine irrespective of quality. If a signicant mass of new patients is shifted towards the high-quality sellers after quality disclosure, those sellers will face congestion in the
absence of a monetary price which rations the scarce quality (Richards-Shubik et al., 2021).
I document that congestion is occurring at high-quality sellers, and that this congestion is
aecting both new patients (who wait 30.5% longer for an additional increment of quality
score) as well as established patients, who were previously seeing a high-quality provider
but now wait longer for appointments

with the exact same provider

due to congestion. This

nding helps underscore the winners and losers of quality disclosure and provides the rst
revealed preference evidence of a willingness-to-pay for provider stars. I calculate that patients are willing to wait 3 additional days for a one standard deviation increase in provider
quality, and this wait time serves as a shadow price for quality which rations demand at
high-quality sellers.

Taken as a whole, these results paint a multidimensional picture of the economic consequences of online quality disclosure.

As markets in health care and beyond increasingly

adopt star ratings and quality certication as a means to ameliorate market woes caused
by imperfect information, they will face trade-os between increased ease of shopping for
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experience goods and congestion at high-quality sellers. The theoretical model which I introduce along with the empirical evidence I uncover suggests that quality disclosure creates
a new market for quality even in the absence of dierential prices, as wait times can serve as
an equilibrating force. This insight is useful for policymakers who are interested in designing, implementing, and evaluating quality disclosure policies, such as those at the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), because it suggests that increased wait times
for highly rated physicians may reect a market-driven process in the absence of potential
capacity adjustments and price variation.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature. Section 3
lays out a model of patient choice and waiting. Section 4 describes the data and institutional
setting and Section 5 presents the empirical strategy. Section 6 presents the results, discusses
heterogeneity, and institutes robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.

1.2. Related Literature
In this section, I broadly separate the literature about quality disclosure into two components, the demand-side response and the supply-side response. Before summarizing the
literature, I oer a brief introduction to the theory on how incomplete information can cause
market failures, a key problem that disclosure policies hope to remedy. A comprehensive
review of the economics of disclosure can be found in a survey article by Dranove and Jin
(2010).

1.2.1. Information, Market Failures, and Disclosure

Studies on the relationship between and market outcomes emerged shortly after the development of general equilibrium theory. A nding of general equilibrium theory, the rst
fundamental welfare theorem, holds that under a certain standard set of assumptions, such as
well-behaved preferences and perfectly competitive markets, the competitive market equilibrium will be Pareto ecient in that it will exhaust all gains from trade.
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However, an

important condition of the welfare theorem that must hold for the results to obtain is the
assumption of perfect information. Suggesting that the market for medical care falls short
on this dimension, Arrow (1963, p. 951) writes, uncertainty as to the quality of the product
is perhaps more intense here [medical care] than in any other important commodity.

Akerlof (1970) proves that in markets featuring asymmetric information, less-than-ecient
levels of trade might occur if one side of the market sorts on quality and the other side cannot
readily observe quality

ex ante

but nonetheless knows that low-quality goods will be put on

the market rst. This creates an adverse selection problem, with consumers who are wary of
poor quality products, or lemons. For disclosure to ameliorate adverse selection, disclosed
quality information must be (1) noticed by the market participants and (2) acted upon.
Nelson (1970) introduces a useful taxonomy of search goods versus experience goods, with
search goods allowing consumers to inspect products for quality prior to consumption while
experience goods requiring consumers to learn about quality after purchase. In addition to
search versus experience goods, a credence good is a product for which quality may not be
observable by the consumer until long after consumption, if ever.

The market studied in

this paper, physician services, has elements of search, experience, as well as credence goods.
Broadly speaking, the more information that is available

ex ante

in a market with quality

heterogeneity, the more the product is similar to a search good than a credence or experience
good, and disclosure can be used as a lever to moderate if a good is search, experience, or
credence type.

The economics literature draws a distinction between voluntary and mandatory information
disclosure. With mandatory disclosure, all sellers must post or publish quality information.
With voluntary disclosure, it is ambiguous whether rms will choose to disclose the quality of
their oering. The theory literature (Grossman and Hart 1980; Grossman 1981; Jovanovic
1982) nds that when disclosure is costless and veriably truthful, all sellers should voluntarily disclose quality because consumers assume if a seller does not disclose, that seller
is low-quality. When disclosure is costly, only sellers with suciently high quality should
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choose to disclose (Jovanovic, 1982). In contrast, Bederson et al. (2018) nd that voluntary
disclosure might not occur by high-quality sellers due to counter-signaling; in essence, high
quality sellers choose not to disclose their quality, sending a signal to buyers that they are
such high quality that they do not need to disclose. In the setting studied in this paper, disclosure is mandated throughout the health system, and questions about voluntary disclosure
are not applicable.

1.2.2. Demand-Side Responses to Disclosure

Until fairly recently, there was very little empirical evidence that consumers observe and
act upon disclosed quality information.

A paper by Mathios (2000) nds that when the

Nutrition Labeling and Education Act required disclosure of fat content on salad dressings,
high-fat dressings experienced a signicant reduction in sales. Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006),
focusing on online reviews, also nd that consumers are responsive to disclosure. The authors
looked at the same book that sold on both Amazon.com and BarnesAndNoble.com and found
that books with a higher review score on one site had higher sales on that same site. By
focusing on the same exact book at two online retailers, they cleverly controlled for actual
quality of the product.

To measure the eect of information disclosure, most studies rely on panel data methods.
For example, in a wide variety of health care contexts, the literature shows that consumers
are responsive to disclosure in the form of report card ratings.

Studying health plans,

Scanlon et al. (2002) show that people avoid health plans with many below-average ratings.
The authors controlled for xed, unobserved plan traits by leveraging a natural experiment when General Motors released plan report cards.

Dafny and Dranove (2008) study

Medicare HMO report card disclosure and nd that consumers switch to high-quality plans
independently of report cards (driven by word-of-mouth information), but also that disclosure induces a response to satisfaction scores.

This eect is larger when there is large

variation in quality. Demand-side responses to quality report cards are shown to occur for
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hospitals (Dranove and Sfekas 2008; Pope 2009), fertility clinics (Bundorf et al., 2009), and
(in a stated preferences experiment) for joint replacement practices (Schwartz et al., 2021).

Identifying the eect of information disclosure on demand-side decisions is complicated by
the fact that in almost all settings, rating scores (which are observable to the researcher) are
correlated with other factors that are unobservable to the researcher, but observable to the
economic agents. One such example is word-of-mouth reputation. These unobserved factors
will cause biased estimates in the cross-section, and estimates of the ratings eect on demand
will be overstated if publicized ratings are positively correlated with unobservable factors. Of
course, the bias could run in the opposite direction, too (e.g., if provider panels are limited
in size and high quality providers are full, a form of capacity constraint). Jin and Sorensen
(2006) address the omitted variable bias by assessing the demand response to health plan
rating disclosure from the National Committee for Quality Assurance, exploiting a data
set that includes both disclosed ratings as well as non-public plan ratings. They nd that
ratings have an eect on patient choice, particularly for rst-time decisionmakers. Disclosed
information aects only a small number of individuals, but the welfare gains for those individuals are large. The similarities between the Jin and Sorensen study and my research
include the presence of both public and non-public ratings data as well as the importance of
rst-time decisionmakers (in my context, new patients) versus established consumers. Jin
and Sorensen also develop a discrete choice framework for estimating the value of information as a function of estimated parameters. Chernew, Gowrisankaran, and Scanlon (2008)
studied a similar setting of health plan report cards and found a small but signicant eect
of information on plan choices (average value of a report card to employees was about $20
per year).

In contrast to Jin and Sorensen (2006), Chernew, Gowrisankaran, and Scanlon

(2008) specied a Bayesian learning model to quantify the value of information. They assume patients hold priors about the distribution of quality and update to form a posterior
proportional to the prior times the likelihood. They allowed for both continuous or discrete
priors and signals, with discreetness reecting real-world disclosure methods such as stars.

10

Another approach to identifying the causal impact of ratings on demand is a regression
discontinuity design rst initiated by Anderson and Magruder (2012) in a study looking
at the market for restaurant services in the context of Yelp.com.

The authors nd that

increasing a restaurant's Yelp score by a half-star (the smallest increment displayed on the
website) causes restaurants in their study sample to sell out 19 percentage points more
frequently compared to a restaurant without the benet of a higher rating. That paper not
only provides credible estimates of demand eects of ratings in the food service industry,
but is also notable for introducing a novel application of regression discontinuity design for
the purposes of identifying the eect of ratings on quantity demanded. The authors point
out that the underlying distribution of actual, raw ratings for restaurants is continuous, yet
the website displays ratings only in discrete, rounded bins. Leveraging this rounding, which
is widespread in internet-based rating systems, they used the mass of restaurants just below
and just above the rounding cuto thresholds to identify the causal eect of an increased
score on volume, laying the groundwork for the identication strategy used in this paper.

Anderson and Magruder's regression discontinuity design has been applied to a variety of
settings where credence and/or experience goods are bought and sold.

Some of this has

been in the context of health care, where physician quality is heterogeneous and dicult
to discern ex ante.

For example, in an unpublished manuscript, Luca and Vats (2013)

collect ratings from a crowdsourced online doctor platform (ZocDoc) and nd that a halfstar improvement in a doctor's rating boosts the likelihood that the doctor will have an
appointment booked through ZocDoc by 10%. A drawback to this study is that provider
participation on ZocDoc is voluntary as opposed to mandatory (in my paper, ratings are
required for all doctors in the system). Providers on ZocDoc can additionally choose to pay a
subscription to achieve a veried status and optimal placement on the webpage, suggesting
that there may be unobserved selection into prominent disclosure. In another unpublished
manuscript, Brown, Gandhi, Hansman, and Veiga (2018) look at General Practice (GP)
clinics in the English National Health Service (NHS) and nd that a half-star improvement
for a GP practice increases quarterly enrollment in the practice by 0.05% on a baseline
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yearly enrollment growth of 1.6%. The Brown et al. (2018) paper is the study most similar
to mine.

Some important dierences, however, relate to the setting.

Brown et al.

study

the causal impact of star ratings in the market for GP practices in England whereas this
paper studies the market for doctors and other providers in the United States. The English
NHS and the United States health systems dier substantially with respect to autonomy
of patient choice at all levels of the health system. For example, GPs in England operate
according to geographic catchment areas and only since 2015 have patients who live outside
of a GP's practice area been allowed to register with that GP. And health care in Great
Britain is marked by long waiting times and failure to provide certain types of treatments
(Feldstein, 2007). Furthermore, the GP practices in the Brown et al. paper have an average
of 5.9 practitioners per practice, so ratings are not specic to individual providers, while my
study focuses on individual providers rather than practices.

The eect of ratings on demand is not limited to health care and restaurants. Hunter (2020)
nds that demand for automotive repair services is responsive to online star ratings, and
Magnusson (2019) nds that increasing a home furnishing product rating by a half star on
Wayfair.com leads to a 5% increase in demand for that item. Both papers use the regression
discontinuity from rounded ratings to identify the causal eect.

1.2.3. Supply-Side Responses to Disclosure

In addition to the demand-side response to quality disclosure, supply-side responses also
may have an eect on market performance.

Jin and Leslie (2003) nd that disclosure of

restaurant report cards causes rms to improve product quality.

The authors show that

restaurants obtaining an A relative to a B grade causes restaurants to have 5% greater
revenue, but also that grade cards cause a 20% decrease in foodborne illness hospitalizations,
a decrease not fully explained by consumers switching from low to high hygiene restaurants.
This implies that disclosure causes rms to increase quality, a fact that they attribute to
reducing adverse selection via disclosure.
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However, Dranove, Kessler, McClellan, and Satterthwaite (2003) observe that disclosure can
have countervailing eects which may be welfare-reducing. Using a dierence-in-dierence
design in a study of heart attack patients and coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgeries,
the authors found that report cards improved matching of patients to hospitals, increased
the amount of CABG surgeries, and shifted this treatment from ex ante sicker to ex ante
healthier patients, who derive less of a benet from the more intense CABG procedure,
resulting in higher costs and worse outcomes. On net, the authors conclude that report card
disclosure caused doctors to change behavior in a welfare-reducing way. Similar unintended
consequences are highlighted by Werner and Asch (2005).

A major concern is that disclosing ratings might incentivize suboptimal behavior on the
part of sellers, particularly when quality is multidimensional.

Building o the multitask-

ing literature of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), Feng Lu (2012) nds that an initiative
to report nursing home quality data that discloses some product attributes but not others
had the eect of realigning the relative returns across dierent quality dimensions, leading
to improvement on reported quality dimensions but deterioration along other dimensions.
Given that patient demand was responsive to this disclosure, the reallocation of eort across
tasks might reduce welfare if there is large misalignment between the social planner's objectives and what can be measured (Baker 2002; Gibbons 2010). In the context of a health
system disclosing aggregate survey ratings for each doctor, if ratings reect dierent quality
attributes than what patients actually desire, disclosure could be harmful. In the context
of credence goods, where the consumer might have diculty assessing quality, this problem
might be particularly severe. For example, if a patient values medical care and amenities,
but faces challenges in observing the medical skill of a doctor, that patient might rate the
provider based on only amenities (such as the magazines in the waiting room) and be unable
to opine on other elements that enter into their utility. This situation creates a rating score
that is misaligned with provider quality. As observed by Baker (2002), the misalignment
between what can be measured by scores and what is valued by consumers may inhibit
success of a disclosure policy such as doctor ratings.
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Finally, Kolstad (2013) found that cardiologists, when faced with report card disclosure,
responded to both nancial and non-nancial (intrinsic motivation) incentives to increase
quality. Using the risk-adjustment model that underlies report cards, Kolstad identied the
magnitude of the eect of new information by exploiting the fact that dierent surgeons gain
more or less information about their relative performance compared to substitute surgeons.
He concluded that not only does prot motivate reductions in relative average mortality
risk, but intrinsic non-pecuniary motivations are relatively large. This result implies that in
a model with no immediate dierentiation on prices, sellers may still respond to information
disclosure because of non-nancial determinants of provider utility.

Richards-Shubik et al. (2021) point out that, in equilibrium, prices serve to ration quality
when quality is scarce, and in the absence of prices for quality (which may be the case in
health care), congestion serves the role of equilibrating the market. They discuss the bias
that can result from estimating models of consumer demand that include taste for quality
but do not account for disutility from congestion. Studying the market for heart surgery,
they found that this bias can be empirically large.

I next present a model about the equilibrium eects of disclosure and turn to the institutional
setting studied in this paper.

1.3. Rationing Demand by Wait List: A Theoretical Model
In this section, I introduce a theoretical model which ties together two related empirical
observations that I observe in the data (that demand is responsive to star ratings and that
a higher star rating causes a longer wait times,

ceterus paribus ).

This model is inspired

by Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) and introduces a way in which wait times function very
much like a price and clear the market when prices are absent.

2

A key feature of the

model is attacking the assumption that demand for care is unchanged throughout the wait

2

This intuition of this model is used extensively in the study of the National Health Service in the United

Kingdom, where wait lists for elective surgeries are frequent.
Propper (2000), for example.
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See Cullis, Jones, and Propper (2000) and

(Cullis and Jones, 1985) and I link wait time to demand by recognizing that the value of
care decays the longer care is postponed. For example, a high-quality doctor might refer a
patient with coronavirus symptoms to get monoclonal antibodies, which are helpful if given
early but which decay in eectiveness the longer the duration between illness and infusion,
whereas a low quality doctor might not refer a patient for monoclonal antibodies at all.

The insight of the model's equilibrium conditions derives from the idea that wait times
equilibrate a queue by rising or falling until the number of individuals who join the queue
is equal to the number of patients who get treatment in a given time period. I rst start by
modeling the marginal joiner of a queue.

1.3.1. Marginal Joiner of a Queue

I assume that patients who are seeking care from a highly-rated family medicine physician
might not be able to see that physician right away.

The fundamental economic decision

faced by the patient when they need care is whether to join the queue and wait to see the
highly-rated physician or not. The patient follows the following intuitive cost vs. benet
decision rule: if the present value of the care (when it is eventually delivered) exceeds the
cost of joining the wait list, they will schedule an appointment. The binary decision

J

for a

person to join the wait list to see the higher-rated physician is:

J=



1,

if

c < ve−dt


0,

if

c > ve−dt

The present value of care is determined by the product of the current value of the care,

v,

which may include the value derived from a timely referral to a specialist, and an exponential function of the decay rate of demand,

d,

and wait time,

t.

The model parameters

depend on the dierential levels (of cost, value, and decay) between the low and high rated
providers. The costs of joining the queue for care are denoted by
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c

(e.g., calling to schedule

the appointment).

3 For the ith individual, their value is

vi (d, t) = vi e−dt

Appendix Figure 2 shows the cost-to-benet tradeo of a patient adding their name to a
wait list for given values of

c, v , and d as a function of the wait time t.

the queue for care at the date of scheduling an appointment is
and costs to join the queue are
not is

t̂1 .

If the wait time

t

c,

v1

If the value of joining

and the decay rate is

d1

then the critical length of time for joining the queue or

is greater than

t̂1 ,

then costs exceed benets:

c > ve−dt .

So the

patient would not add their name to the queue.

v , c,

As

dier among demanders of care, the critical value

t̂

will vary. For queue joiners,

t̂

must be such that the net present value of the benet exceeds the cost. I next focus on the

marginal joiner, the individual whose t̂ = t.
benets must equal expected costs:

Accordingly, for the marginal joiner, expected

ve−dt = c

and we can observe the following rst order

conditions which follow from dierentiation and substitution:

∂v/∂d = vt > 0

∂v/∂t = vd > 0
An increase in the decay rate of the value of care will make someone previously on the
margin of joining the queue not join. This is seen in Figure A2 holding
from the curve

v1 e−d1 t

to

v1 e−d2 t .

3

v1

to

xed and moving

Furthermore, holding the decay rate constant at

increasing the expected wait time from
placed on the care from

v1

t̂2

to

t̂1

d2

while

increases the marginal queue joiner's value

v2 .

Note that unlike earlier models of queuing, e.g., Barzel (1974), the costs of joining the wait list do not

involve physically standing in a line, but merely placing your name on a list.
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1.3.2. Rate of Joining the Queue

Next, given a xed out-of-pocket price of the medical care (e.g., the patient pays only a
pre-set copay for all family medicine), what is the rate of joining the queue? The rate of

t̂ driven by decay rate d and xed consumer attributes.

joining is determined by variation in

As a rst step, assume everyone in the population has the same rate
factor that gives rise to variation in
moment of illness onset. Assume

v

is continuous and has nite range
value the good at

v1

t̂

in the population is

v,

d.

Then, the only

the valuation of care at the

is distributed in the population according to

0 ≤ v ≤ v̄ .

Someone at an expected wait of

f (v),

t1

which

must then

or more to join the queue. The number of people who join the queue

per period, as a function of

v

and

N,

the population size, is given by

Z

v̄

f (v)dv = N [1 − F (v)]

h(v) = N
v

and can be converted to

t-space

by substituting for

v = ce−dt̂

to get

j(t̂) = N [1 − F (ce−dt̂ )]

Which is the number of people for whom the critical delay time (i.e., to join/not join queue)
is

t̂

or greater. Accordingly,

j(t) = N [1 − F (ce−dt )]
is the number of people who would queue at wait time

t.

Now, I point out the j-intercept:

j(0) = N [1 − F (c)]

which is the number of people who value the care more than the cost of simply joining the
queue. This is also known as the potential joiners.
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t

The slope of the queue-joining function with respect to

is:

∂j
∂v
= −N f (v)
= −N f (v)dv
∂t
∂t

t

This slope is negative which implies as

goes up, the number of queue joiners goes down.

The slope of the joining function with respect to the decay rate,

intercept
positive

t

of the joining function because at
queue time, as

d

t = 0,

∂j
∂d , does not change at the

there is no change in

j(t).

However, for a

goes up, the number of queue joiners goes down.

1.3.3. Supply of Family Medicine Rate Given Queue

Beyond whatever exogenous factors inuence the quantity supplied (e.g., input cost shifters,
regulation, etc.), queues may also inuence the rate of supply. Supply at any given time
depends on those exogenous factors

w̃

plus the wait time

t

h

and we assume that supply is

positively aected by wait time:

sh (w̃, t),

The queue size at any given moment

rate of change

such that

h

∂sh /∂t > 0

is written as

in the queue size at any point in time

Qh =
h

P∞

k=0 (jn−k

− sn−k ).4

And the

is written as

Q̇h = jh (th ) − sh (th )

The expected wait time in period

h is th ,

the total number of people waiting in a given time

divided by the supply service rate:

th =
4

Qh
sh

See Lindsay and Feibenbaum section I.B for exposition on normalizing the number of potential joiners

in each queue.
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1.3.4. Equilibrium and the Implications for the Empirical Setting

This system reaches an equilibrium at

t∗

when

th = th+1 .

the rate of change in the queue length equals zero,

This occurs (by denition) when

Q̇h = 0.

The equilibrium of this supply and demand system is wait time
that

t∗

and queue size

j(t∗ ) = s(t∗ ); the number of people who would join the queue at wait time t∗

service rate (supply rate) at that

t∗ .

And in this state, equilibrium queue size is

Q∗

such

equals the

Q∗ = j(t∗ )·t∗ .

This equilibrium is one in which wait times function very much like a price. In contrast to
markets with prices, where clearing the market occurs via an increase in the price of the
good and the demanders sort by willingness to pay, in this model,

wait times

clears the

market by making the medical care less valuable as time in the queue increases. Since there
is variation in the population according to initial value
rate), the patients seeking care who have high values
out those with lower

v

and higher

∗

> 0).

of the care as well as

d

(the decay

and low decay factors

d

will crowd

d.

This model has testable implications.
physicians (t

v

v

I expect to see longer wait times at higher rated

This also implies that at a given moment in time, the relative number

or people in the queue is higher at higher-rated physicians. In my empirical setting, star
ratings may causes an increase in demand at highly-rated physicians but at the same time,
those physicians do not have an ability to modify their prices in the short run as a response
to the disclosure. This model suggests market such as the one I study can be equilibrated by
wait times instead of prices. There is an important implication that follows from this model:
although an observer might at rst believe that an empirical nding of higher wait times
for higher quality reects an inecient backlog of health care services, instead that same
queue might actually be reective of a market clearing process.

In the short run, before

high-quality providers can expand capacity or adjust prices, what does the disclosure do? It
might lead to the creation of a brand-new market for quality that is cleared via a queuing
mechanism rather than a price mechanism.
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I would expect, as well, that as the short run bleeds into the long run and capacity of
physician quality can adjust, the wait times may shrink back to zero.

Accordingly, the

pair of twin empirical ndings that (a) quality rating disclosure reallocates consumers to
high-quality sellers and (b) congestion increases at the highly-rated sellers in the absence of
prices, might not reect a market ineciency but instead reect a market process in which

5 In the following sections, I

wait time takes the role of prices in rationing scarce demand.

show that these two empirical predictions do in fact occur. The theoretical model relates
these empirical ndings to a single economic process.

1.4. Institutional Setting and Data
1.4.1. The Large Midwestern Health System

This paper uses data from a large Midwestern Health System (the health system), a nonprot integrated health system located in the upper United States. The health system has
46 hospitals (a mix of larger urban hospitals, such as in Fargo, Sioux Falls, Bismarck, and
Bemidji, as well as smaller rural hospitals and an acute care children's hospital), more than
200 clinic locations, and nearly 1,500 providers. The health system is known for delivering
high quality care in the region: In recent years, U.S. News and World Report has ranked
the system's teaching hospital the top hospital in the state. The health system employs the
majority of their physicians, and for all of the major insurance providers in the region, if the
health system is in-network, patients would have equal access to all health system providers.
Importantly, this uniform insurance coverage largely shuts down the role of out-of-pocket
price in patient choices conditional on the insured choosing to receive care at the system.
The majority of the health system's doctors are compensated on a work relative value unit
(RVU) schedule.

5

This implies that policymakers ought not to worry about an increase in short-run congestion when

quality ratings are disclosed because that could indicate an equilibrium sorting process.
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1.4.2. Rating Data

As part of the health system's ongoing eorts to promote patient satisfaction, the system
has collected surveys using external consultants (survey providers). These national survey
providers, Press Ganey and NRC Health, administer post-visit questionnaires related to the
patients' subjective experience with their health care provider. The questionnaires are sent
out randomly and ask a series of standardized questions based on a survey developed by
AHRQ called the Clinician and Groups Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and
Systems (CG-CAHPS). Based on dividing the total number of visits by the total number
of submitted surveys, about 5% of total outpatient visits are followed up with a completed
survey. Each provider is evaluated according to seven questions, including Using any number from 0 to 10, where 0 is the worst provider possible and 10 is the best provider possible,
what number would you use to rate this provider?

6

The answers to each of these questions are linearly transformed to a 5-point scale, and then
the arithmetic mean across questions is taken to create a score for each provider for a survey
visit. Details of this scaling transformation performed by the health system and their survey
provider are available from me upon request.

Data from survey responses (and accompanying provider ratings) date back to 2016. However, until late 2018, rating data were never disclosed on the website, but instead held
internally by the health system. On November 2, 2018, the health system launched online
quality disclosure through a major overhaul of its website to include ratings and reviews for
each doctor. Prior to this date, quality ratings were not available to patients and after that
date, visitors to the health system's website see a prominently placed rating in large font
(on a scale of 1 to 5 in one-tenth intervals) with corresponding gold star symbols next to a
picture of each physician. The website also displays the number (raw count) of reviews. An
artistic rendition of what the star ratings look like to consumers is found in Appendix Figure
A1. According to the health system's disclosure policy, which is common across the health

6

The full list of survey questions is found in Appendix A1.
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care industry, doctors with fewer than 30 ratings were not displayed until they reached the
30-rating minimum. For the November launch of rating, to âseedâ the ratings with
enough data, the health system used a 2-year look-back window to late 2016. The health
system regularly updates the ratings for each provider as new survey data arrived, such that,
through July 2020, the rating displayed for each doctor reected the cumulative mean of all
ratings to that date, starting from the beginning of the look-back window. In my data, I
observe about 500,000 total surveys received by the health system between 2016 and 2020.

Although the values for each patient survey may range from 0 to 5, the vast majority of
providers score highly on average and the overall distribution of average provider ratings is

7 The provider-level ratings have a mean

quite compressed near the top of the star range.

of 4.78, standard deviation of 0.13, and a slight negative skewness.

A histogram of the

distribution of average ratings is in Figure 1.1.

For each provider, I have information on listed specialty from the system website, their professional licensing credential (e.g., MD, registered nurse, physician assistant, etc.), provider
gender, and a provider identier (both the national provider identier [NPI] as well as an
internal health system provider identier). These data come from hospital human resources
data and the health system website. Using the entire history of individual patient surveys, I
reconstruct the average (mean) raw rating for each doctor at any given day; I then construct
what the website displayed historically and verify using the Internet Archive Wayback Machine and internal communication with the health system. This results in a panel at the
month level for each doctor containing the raw rating for each doctor on the 15th day of
each month (the middle). From the raw, unrounded ratings, I also construct the rounded
rating (to the nearest one-tenth), which is the score that is displayed on the health system
website. To account for the fact that ratings drift slightly as more surveys are returned, I
restrict the panel to include only providers whose rating is displayed at the same value for

7

A top competitor in the region also posts star ratings and has a similar distribution of average provider

ratings.

The competitor does not post star ratings for all providers (unlike the health system I study),

perhaps because it is not an employer of most providers.
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8

the duration of the month.

1.4.3. Electronic Health Records Data

In addition to rating score data, I merge data that comes from a three-year extract of EHRs.
The EHR contains de-identied visit data for all patient encounters across all locations in
the health system during the three year period from 2017 to 2019. The EHR data contains
International Classication of Diseases (ICD), doctor and patient identiers, location and
date of the service performed, and select health and demographic information, such as patient
age, gender, zip code, body mass index (BMI), blood pressure, and smoking status at time of
visit. Critically for this analysis, from the beginning of this window through August 2019, I
have a variable that encodes whether the patient visit was a brand-new relationship between
the patient and the provider or an existing relationship. The nal months (quarter four of
2019) do not have this new patient visit variable because the EHR system takes some time
to calculate and populate this eld electronically. For my main analysis, I restrict providers
to those practicing the specialty of family medicine according to the health system website;
this is the most common specialty in the system (21% of providers) and is a specialty that
I hypothesize would permit comparison shopping or consumer search online. The analytic
data set comprises a panel of new patient visits at the doctormonth level and includes
average rating (the running variable) and displayed ratings for each provider in the system.

1.4.4. Summary Statistics

Table 1.1 displays summary statistics for the data used in this paper.

The upper panel

describes the EHR data; there are more than 12 million total visits across 3 years and about
1 million unique patients. Demographic information available to me in the EHRs is limited.
The average patient is 38 years old with a BMI of 27.5, indicating overweight but not obese.
We expect patients who interact with the health system to be somewhat less healthy than

8

Dropping provider-months that display more than one rounded rating per month allows for a sharp

regression discontinuity design but means that close to the discontinuity, there is a relatively smaller mass
of data compared to further away. Empirical robustness checks in subsequent sections address this issue.
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the average person in the general population, and nothing about this health system suggests
atypical patient composition.

The lower panel of the summary statistics table contains provider-month level summary
statistics for the family medicine providers, the baseline cohort for this analysis.

These

providers have (on average) 178 visits per month and see about 7 brand-new patients per
month. These volume measures are skewed such that the mean is larger than the median,
meaning there are some providers who have considerably larger visit volume and new patient
volume. The average provider rating is a 4.78 and the standard deviation is 0.13. Half of
providers have a rating that is rounded up, and the other half have a rating that is rounded
down. At the instant quality disclosure was launched, the average count of reviews used to
determine the average score of a provider was 228.

As more ratings were added as more

surveys came in, the average rating count increased to 298.

9 On the website, patients are

shown the number of ratings a provider received, and a higher number of ratings could
potentially send a stronger signal of quality to patients, all else equal.

In total, 55% of

family medicine providers are physicians (MDs and Doctors of Osteopathic Medicine [DOs],
with the vast majority of these MDs), and the remainder are mid-level practitioners (such as
advanced registered nurse practitioners, physician's assistants, etc.). There are 340 unique
family medicine providers and the provider-month panel has 2,730 observations.

In Table 1.2, I assess the correlation between new patient visit volume at a given provider
and that provider's online rating. I regress new patient visits per month on the provider's
displayed rating score, and I estimate alternative specications with month-year xed eects,
professional credential xed eects (e.g., MD vs. PA vs. Nurse Practitioner) and both. In all
specications, I nd an

inverse relationship between rating score and new patient demand.10

This negative relationship between rating score and new patient visit volume can also be

9

The ratings were seeded with a 2-year lookback of historical ratings which explains an N larger than

1 on launch of ratings.

10

I estimate the coecient on score to be about -16, so a one-star increase is associated with 16 fewer

new patients per month. Scaling this by a factor of 1/10, since ratings are displayed on the website in 0.1
intervals, a one-tenth rating increase, say from 4.7 to 4.8, is associated with 1.6
month.
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fewer

new patients per

seen in the slope of the points in the binned scatterplot in Appendix Figure A3.

I hypothesize that one driver of this inverse and unexpected relationship arises because highquality doctors are also frequently near capacity (have full patient panels). If matching with
a high-quality family medicine doctor is an absorbing state, then one would expect higherrated doctors to also be willing to accept fewer new patients because they are already near
capacity. Despite the negative correlation I nd in Table 1.2, it is reasonable to believe that
patients value quality and that there is not a structurally negative relationship between
quality and volume. As a consequence, I approach the question with a causal design in the
next section.

1.5. Empirical Strategy
1.5.1. Baseline Regression Discontinuity

I use regression discontinuity methods to compute the eect of an increased provider rating on demand for new patient visits (Thistlethwaite and Campbell 1960; Angrist and Lavy
1999; Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw 2001; Almond, Doyle Jr, Kowalski, and Williams
2010). In particular, the primary empirical strategy is to estimate regression discontinuity
and dierence-in-discontinuities models, which combines traditional regression-discontinuity
estimation with dierence-in-dierences models (Lalive 2008; Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano
2016). This discontinuity approach to identication is pursued because although providers'
actual ratings are continuous and smooth functions of the data, on the health system website, displayed ratings are rounded to the nearest tenth. For example, a doctor with a 4.749
will be rounded

down

to 4.7 stars, while a doctor with 4.750 will be rounded

even though the underlying ratings are very close.

up to 4.8 stars,

Figure 1.2 outlines this identication

strategy. I estimate the number of new patient visits per provider per month approaching
the cuto from the left side as well as the right side. In the gure, Doctor A and Doctor
B have similar unrounded survey scores, but because of the rounding, their star rating is
displayed dierently on the website. The causal eect is the jump precisely at the cuto;
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the assumption required for identication is that the other variables that aect new patient
volume do not change discontinuously at the rounding cuto. This is a sharp regression discontinuity design, since all providers with ratings above the rounding threshold are treated
by being rounded up.

After constructing a panel at the level of provider-month, I estimate two series of regressions.
The rst series of regressions are based on the classical regression discontinuity estimator:

Yit = β0 + β1 1(R̃it > 0) + β2 R̃it + β3 R̃it 1(R̃it > 0) + γc + εit

where

Yit

is the number of new patient visits per provider

i

in month

variable, the standardized raw rating, which runs from -.05 to +.05.

t, R̃it

(1.1)

is the running

I standardize each

observation by the distance between the actual rating and the nearest one-tenth cuto point
because there are multiple dierent rounding cutos (e.g., 4.75, 4.85, etc.). This is common
practice (Anderson and Magruder, 2012). Accordingly,

β1

is the coecient on whether the

provider's rating was rounded up (the coecient of interest) and
distance to the rounding threshold. Lastly,

β2

is the coecient on the

β3 is the coecient on the interaction between the

running variable and being rounded up. This allows for alternative slopes to the regression
line on both sides of the discontinuity. Also included are cuto-specic xed eects,

γc .

I

estimate this as a global polynomial of orders 1, 2, and 3. In robustness checks, I estimate
the regressions using alternative bandwidths (distances from the cuto ) both by varying the
bandwidth size by .005 and use optimal bandwidth construction of Calonico et al. (2014). I
weight these regressions based on review count, as higher number of reviews might have an
outsized impact on behavior; this is consistent with more ratings leading to a more precise
signal (Magnusson, 2019). Robustness tests in a subsequent section address the economic
importance of this weighting.

My preferred specication is a global linear (rst-order) polynomial with alternative slopes
on both sides of the discontinuity, with cuto-specic xed eects and weighting by review
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count.

11

The linear polynomial is preferred because a visual examination of the binned

scatterplot of the running variable and the outcome of interest showed no obvious nonlinear
trend, but I report variations by polynomial order and according to global and local linear
regression. Standard errors are clustered at the provider level to account for potential error
correlation within providers.

1.5.2. Dierence-in-Discontinuities

The second series of estimators I construct are dierence-in-discontinuities estimators (Grembi et al.,
2016). In addition to the previously mentioned variables, I construct a new variable,

P OSTit

that evaluates to 1 if the provider-month observation occurs while the ratings were publicly

12 I am able to implement the

disclosed online, and evaluates to 0 before they were disclosed.

dierence-in-discontinuities estimator because although the health system publicly disclosed
provider rating scores only from November 2018 onward, they had been collecting ratings
for many years beforehand. The dierence-in-discontinuities regression takes the following
form:

Yit = β0 + β1 1(R̃it > 0) + β2 R̃it + β3 R̃it 1(R̃it > 0) + β4 P OSTit 1(R̃it > 0)+
β5 P OSTit + β6 P OSTit R̃it + β7 P OSTit R̃it 1(R̃it > 0) + γc + εit
where just like above,
the parameters

β1

Yit

and

(1.2)

is the number of new patient visits per month. I recover separately

β4 ; β1

captures the causal eect of an increased rating on new patient

visit volume when information

was not

disclosed, and

β4

captures the relative causal eect

of an increased rating score on new patient visit volume when the information

was disclosed.

Again, I include cuto-specic xed eects, allow for alternative slopes on both sides of the

11

I also estimate a model that does not include cuto xed eects.

Although the literature on rating

response, e.g. Anderson and Magruder (2012) includes these cuto specic xed eects, I want to ensure
that the estimation is robust to not including this xed eect. According to Cattaneo et al. (2016), the pooled
regression discontinuity estimator without cuto xed eects can be interpreted as a double average; the
weighted average across cutos of the local average treatment eect for all units facing each particular cuto
value. The weighted average gives higher weights to the particular cutos that are most observed in the
data in terms of observations.

12

In these specications, I drop November 2018, a partially treated month.

The disclosure began on

November 2, and results are robust to considering this to be a fully treated month.
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discontinuity, and weight by count of reviews. As in the previous regressions, standard errors
are clustered at the provider level.

1.6. Results
In this section, I show results on market responses to quality disclosure.

I present two

sets of results about quantity demanded, a baseline regression discontinuity analysis, which
identies a causal eect based on the rounded star rating, and a dierence-in-discontinuities
analysis that further leverages the time variation in patient exposure to online ratings.
Next I discuss heterogeneity in the demand response to rating disclosure along a number
of dimensions including provider specialization, patient age and health, and the density of
providers in a given geographic area.

I then show the eects of an increased star rating

on wait times using a regression discontinuity identication strategy similar to what is used
when analyzing the demand response but examining individual wait times. Finally, I test the
robustness of my results by implementing a number of standard checks from the regression
discontinuity literature.

1.6.1. Information Disclosure and Demand Response

Baseline Regression Discontinuity

In Figure 1.3, I begin by showing the relationship between the monthly new visits for a given
family medicine provider and the distance that the provider's rating is from being rounded
up (the running variable), with the distance normalized to zero. This binned scatterplot with
40 equally-sized bins provides a non-parametric way of visualizing the relationship between
the running variable and the outcome of interest and assists with evaluating the presence
of an eect at the discontinuity. Points to the left of the vertical dashed line represent the
conditional mean within a bin for providers with ratings that are rounded down; points to
the right of the vertical line correspond to the conditional mean of providers who have a
rating which is rounded up. Overlaid on this plot are linear regression lines t separately
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for data on each side of the rounding cuto.

I observe a large and economically meaningful jump in the quantity demanded of new patient
visits that takes place precisely at the discontinuity. In Figure 1.3, providers who have their
ratings rounded down see approximately 5.5 new patients per month, whereas precisely at
the cuto, I observe a level increase in the number of additional new patients a doctor sees
of approximately 3 new patients.

In Table 1.3, I provide a regression-based estimate of the causal impact of an increased
provider rating on new patient visits. Columns 1-6 of Table 1.3 present various alternative
specications of Equation 5: linear, quadratic, and cubic in the running variable and allowing
for vs. not allowing for alternative slopes on each side of the discontinuity. Based on the
absence of a non-linear relationship between the running variable and the outcome variable
in Figure 1.3, my preferred specication is a linear rst order polynomial with an interaction
between the running variable and the indicator for a provider's rating being rounded up;
this is shown in Column 4 of Table 1.3. The estimated jump persists regardless of whether I
assume the relationship between the running variable (distance to rounding) and the outcome
variable (new patient visits) is linear, quadratic, or cubic.

I estimate that an increase in

a provider's rating causes 2.96 additional patients per month to visit that provider (on a
baseline of 5.475, this corresponds to a 54% increase). This causal estimate of the demand
response is robust to alternative functional form specications.

Leveraging Time Variation in Disclosure via Dierence-in-Discontinuities

In Figure 1.4, I show the results of exploiting the unique institutional setting in which the
health care system collected ratings for more than two years prior to ever disclosing provider
quality scores to patients. I plot two separate series in a single graph: the blue dots represent
the conditional mean of the outcome variable, breaking the data into 40 equally-sized bins,
for the period of time when the ratings

were

disclosed online and when I have data on new

patient visit volume (December 2018-August 2019). In contrast, the red triangles represent
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the conditional mean of the running variable, but for the pre-disclosure time period, from
January 2017 to October 2018, when ratings

were not

observed by patients.

The results of Figure 1.4 are striking. Before online information disclosure of quality scores
for providers, a provider whose score was rounded up was expected to see no additional
patients per month. This zero-magnitude eect is seen when looking at the red regression
line, which shows no meaningful jump in the outcome variable as the threshold is crossed
for the pre-disclosure data.

However, after disclosure, I observe a large and statistically

signicant increase in the number of new patients per month for providers with ratings
rounded up. This can also be seen by noticing that to the left of the vertical dashed line
in Figure 4, the blue dots and red triangles are commingled; in contrast, to the right of the
rounding threshold, virtually all of the blue dots are above the red triangles.

I estimate the causal eects that are suggested by Figure 1.4 by using a dierence-indiscontinuities regression and report the results in Table 1.4. This regression corresponds
to Equation 6. The coecient

Rounded Up

corresponds to the causal eect of an increased

quality score in the pre-disclosure period, while the coecient

Post X Rounded Up

corre-

sponds to the causal eect of an increased quality score during the post-disclosure period.
As expected, this eect is estimated as not signicantly dierent than zero when ratings are
not disclosed. However, when the ratings are disclosed online, I nd an eect size of 4.496
new patients per month (an 88% increase o a baseline of 5.100 new patients per month).
This dierence-in-discontinuities model serves as a test to validate if other factors outside
of online disclosure that also occur precisely as a provider's rating crosses the rounding
threshold might causally aect new patient demand. For example, if the internally held but
not released ratings were causing patients to see highly rated doctors more, this might be a
threat to identication. Regression results from Table 1.4 serve to bolster and conrm the
ndings of a large demand response to the disclosure of quality ratings for providers.
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1.6.2. Heterogeneity & Potential Mechanisms

I next explore the heterogeneity that underlies the large demand response to quality disclosure. These heterogeneity analyses will clarify which sub-populations benet from and
which are drivers of the demand response to quality. However, I caution the reader not to
make causal conclusions based on these heterogeneity analyses, as unobserved dierences
across sub-populations inhibit one from making causal connections.

Nonetheless, this se-

ries of heterogeneity analyses sheds light on some of the potential mechanisms behind the
demand-side response to quality disclosure.

Provider Specialization & the Role of Choice versus Referrals

In Table 1.5, I consider the impact of quality disclosure dierentially across provider specialties. The search process by which patients choose providers may dier considerably across
the specialty of the physicians. Up to this point, my central focus was on family medicine
because patients are frequently required to actively choose their primary care provider. In
fact, HMO plans require the active choice of a primary care doctor. Family medicine is also
the most common provider specialty in the data, comprising approximately 20% of all of
the health system's providers. I now consider the eect of quality disclosure on the quantity
of new patient visits at the top ve specialties as listed for providers on the health system
website (family medicine, pediatrics, internal medicine, cancer, and OB/GYN).

Column 1 of Table 1.5 shows a 54% increase in the number of new patient visits per month
for family medicine doctors (also reported in Table 1.3). This eect is large and statistically
signicant.

In contrast, however, in columns 2-5 of Table 1.5, I do not nd statistically

signicant causal eects on the amount of new patient visits for providers with dierent
specialties. None of the coecients are statistically signicantly dierent from zero at the
5% level, regardless of specialty (pediatrics, internal medicine, cancer, and OB/GYN). This
conrms the prior hypothesis that family medicine providers may be those whose demand
is most impacted by rating disclosure.
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What might explain this heterogeneity across the specialties of providers? One possibility
is that at the health system, family medicine providers serve as care coordinators who may
create spillovers in terms of future health. If they can shape the trajectory of future patient
health, then it might be reasonable for demand to be most sensitive to quality disclosure
early on in the chain of care. Buttressing this theory is the fact that insurance design often
forces active choices of primary care providers. In contrast, specialists are often found via a
referral, in which the primary care doctor (rather than the patient) makes the decision about
which doctor to see. This logic is consistent with large rating eects for family medicine but
not for other specialties.

Another consideration that might drive the dierences across specialties is the variation in
the breadth of a patient's choice set. For example, within the specialty of family medicine,
it is quite possible that all doctors listed within a geographic region could be chosen by a
patient. However, in the case of specialty care for cancer, for example, if a patient needs care
for a brain tumor, a doctor specializing in hematology/blood cancers might not be a valid
substitute. Thus, it does not surprise me that I recover a large eect for family medicine
but not for other specialties, which are more dierentiated within the broad specialty class.

Working against these interpretations is the possibility that there simply is not a large
enough sample to identify a causal eect for the other specialties.

The provider-month

panel for family medicine, the most common specialty, has approximately three times as
many observations as the next highest specialty, so the null eects might not be driven by
the referral versus active choice hypothesis, but instead driven by sample size limitations.

Older or Younger Patients? Healthy Patients or Sick Patients?

In Table 1.6, I show estimates of the causal eect of a higher rating on new patient visits
separately by the ve age groups of adults used by the health system (ages 18-34, 35-49, 5064, 65-79, and 80+). I nd the largest response to quality disclosure is driven by the 18-34
age group (75% more new patients

in that age group per month in response to an increase in
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provider rating). In older patients, the demand responsiveness to quality disclosure is lower
(although even the 65 to 79-year-old subsample shows a statistically signicant demand
response to ratings).

Note as well that the base rate for new patient visits at a given

provider declines with patient age (older patients visit new family medicine doctors at a
much lower rate than younger patients).

The overall pattern that the young adults are most sensitive to quality disclosure is consistent
with primary care having characteristics of a credence good, where young individuals (with
many years ahead of them) are sensitive to quality scores because there may face dicultto-observe (in the short run) returns to provider quality. The result in Table 1.6 is evidence
that younger patients are sensitive to quality disclosure for providers, potentially more than
older patients. Chen (2018) studies the impact of physician Yelp ratings on revenues and
patient volume using Medicare claims, but he nds considerably smaller eects than I do.
My age heterogeneity analysis can partly explain that dierence. Chen's paper uses data
on Medicare patients (the preponderance of beneciaries are age 65+) and combines that
data with ratings from Yelp (a website which might be easier for younger rather than older
individuals to navigate). One reason that the aggregate eect size I nd (Table 1.3) is larger
than what Chen nds in his paper is that I see evidence that a large portion of the eect
of disclosure on quantity demanded is driven by the younger population, which he does not
systematically study. Additionally, there are dierences between the types of information
about physicians found on Yelp and found on the health system website (based on AHRQ
surveys).

In prior studies of demand response to quality disclosure, the ratings are from

surveys in which everyone is eligible to participate. In contrast, my setting relies on quality
disclosure comprising of scores from a survey sent to a random subset of patients who received
care. The dierences between my larger results and the smaller magnitude results seen in
Chen (2018), Brown, et al (working paper), and Luca and Vats (2013) might be due to the
standardized and random nature of the surveys; if this is viewed by patients as more credible,
it might induce a larger demand response. This is consistent with a conversation I had with
a health system CEO who said that he chose to publicly disclose quality scores based on
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AHRQ surveys (such as those studied in my paper) in order to control the information
environment in direct comparison to what patients might nd if they were to go to Yelp
themselves.

In Table 1.7, I explore the relationship between patient health status and responsiveness to
quality score disclosure. First, I separate patients into healthy and unhealthy patients. I
do this three dierent ways: (A) if they ever have a comorbidity diagnosis code that would
trigger a ag in a Charlson Comorbidity Index score, then they are categorized as unhealthy,
e.g., a diagnosis of COPD, dementia, or cancer, for example, (B) I use obesity/BMI

≥30

to

13

separate patients into healthy vs. sick, and (C) if the patient is ever recorded as a smoker.

Columns 1-3 of Table 1.7 show the responsiveness to quality scores for the healthy patients.
Providers whose ratings were rounded up saw 54%, 48%, and 55% more new

healthy patients

per month (where health is dened as no comorbidities, non-obese, and non-smoker, respectively). In contrast, columns 4-6 of Table 1.7 show the responsiveness to quality scores for
the sicker patients. The sicker patients are more responsive to new patient ratings. Providers
with ratings that are rounded up see 64%, 71%, and 54% (comorbidity, obese, and smoker,
respectively) more

unhealthy

patients per month relative to providers with ratings that are

rounded down.

The fact that sicker patients have a larger response to disclosed quality scores is consistent
with the Grossman model of demand for health (Grossman, 1972). As an individual's health
capital stock depreciates with illness, demand may be more sensitive to the quality of service
provided. I note that the demand responsiveness for one category of health (smoking status)
is not as stark as the other two (major comorbidities as well as obesity). Perhaps this is
because there exists young and healthy smokers, and major comborbidities are often present
later in an individual's life.

13

Because my EHR data has only a primary diagnosis on a patient visit level (and not secondary diagnoses),

I compute a Charlson score across all episodes for that patient in the EHR.
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Do Provider Credentials Matter?

In the United States, family medicine is delivered by providers with numerous types of
educational backgrounds and professional credentials. For example, a primary care provider
might be an MD, DO, an advanced registered nurse practitioner, or a physician's assistant.
Each type of provider credential requires dierent post-secondary education in order to
practice, and consumers may view providers with dierent professional credentials in a
dierent light.

In Table 1.8, I explore the impact of professional credentials on the response of patients
to increased quality scores. Half of provider-months in the sample are MDs, and the other
half are non-MDs. I nd that the response to quality scores exclusively takes place among
MDs. MDs see a 102% increase in the number of new patients per month that is causally
attributed to an increase in a displayed provider score, whereas providers with other professional credentials see only a 6.5% increase (not signicantly dierent from zero).

The

mechanism behind this dierence is unclear. Perhaps patients select MDs when they need
a dierent type of care than when they select non-MDs. Given that the MD credential is
typically the longest license to attain (in terms of years of formal schooling and residency),
it is possible that consumer demand is sensitive to this aspect of provider training.

Another possibility that I suspect is that MDs specialize at more complicated care within
family medicine whereas NPs might specialize in more routine care. If patients value high
quality ratings more for more complicated care, that could generate the patterns observed
in Table 1.8, with the majority of the causal eect driven by MDs.

Geographic Density of Physicians

I investigate the eect of provider density per capita on the demand responsiveness to
ratings. In a model of search for physicians, more information may lower search costs, and
provider density per capita may aect search costs, as well. I split the providers in the panel
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into groups which vary according to number of providers per capita in a given geographic
area. Although the actual market for primary care is hard to calculate, I form geographic
counts of providers at the county level. This does not, of course, proxy perfectly for actual
physician geographic markets. However, I use counties because I can acquire the number
of providers not just from the health system but from all physicians using the Area Health
Resource File.

Both per capita levels of all providers and per capita levels of the health

system's providers are computed using 2017 county-level census data (from the Area Health
Resource File [AHRF]). I assign a provider to a particular county by taking the modal
county from which he or she draws patients, and then compute the number of primary care
physicians per capita in each county (according to the AHRF as well as using the health
system's physicians only). The distribution of primary care provider density is more or less
split into two groups, which I call low and high.

I nd that providers working in above-median density counties see a much larger increase in
number of new patients per month attributable to ratings (72%, 84%, for the all-physicians
[AHRF] and the health system only cuts, respectively). See Table 1.9. In contrast to the
large demand response for providers who draw patients from areas with a large number of
family medicine doctors per capita, I do not nd a statistically signicant causal impact
of ratings for providers in the below-median per capita density markets.

An important

factor to consider is that substitute information about provider quality is not randomly
distributed across markets; for example, Yelp or HealthGrades may have substantial presence
in large urban environments, but not in smaller rural settings. The presence of endogenous
substitute information about quality is a dicult challenge to overcome. I am also hesitant
to generalize the results from this heterogeneity analysis because within the health system's
geographic area of operation, there may be insucient variation in provider density across
geography. Perhaps the results might dier if I included the nation's largest cities such as
New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. As such, I believe that more research on this question
is warranted.
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I also test the model of increasing monopoly (Satterthwaite, 1979), which hypothesizes that
as physician supply in an area increases, the price of a reputation good may increase as
the number of sellers in a market rises (in contrast to the canonical model where prices
fall as number of sellers rise).

The Satterthwaite increasing monopoly model hinges on

the hypothesis that consumer search is less ecient in markets with many sellers.

The

conclusion of that model follows from two propositions. First, as the number of physicians
in a market increases, the amount of consumer information about each physician decreases.
For example, in a small town, it is easy to ask around for information about the town
doctors, but in large cities, asking around about quality information for all doctors may be
prohibitively costly.

The second proposition of the increasing monopoly model is that as

search becomes increasingly dicult, consumers become less price sensitive. It follows from
these two propositions that as physician supply increases, fees for primary care rise.

The distribution of primary care providers in the area resource le four the counties served
by the health system falls in three bins, which I call low, medium, and high density of
primary care providers. The distribution of health system physicians (by county) is more
or less split into two groups, which I call low and high. I nd that the physicians from
the high number of physician counties do not have as large in magnitude an eect of
quality disclosure on quantity demanded as the physicians from lower-count communities
(Appendix Table A1). Although Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981) nd evidence supporting
Satterthwaite (1979), one possible reason that I nd a larger response to disclosure in less
physician-rich markets its because dense markets already have other unobserved (by the
econometrician) sources of information about quality. For example, in larger cities, there
may be better complements to the disclosed health system quality ratings (e.g., ratings from
Yelp or HealthGrades) compared to smaller counties. The complementarities between the
health system's quality disclosure and other sources of physician quality information make it
more dicult to evaluate the eect of number of physicians within a geography on the eect
of quality disclosure. Without exogenous variation to exploit on the number of physicians in
an area, it is hard to tell the causal eects of the number of physicians on consumer search.
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1.6.3. Sorting

In the previous sections, I showed that patient demand is responsive to quality score disclosure. In this section, I discuss the equilibrium consequences of this disclosure by studying
the impact of provider rating disclosure on patient sorting.

I study three dimensions of

sorting: (1) Does the information disclosure shift patients to doctors who supply greater
inputs to health? (2) Does the quality disclosure have an eect on brand new patients to
the health system, on existing patients, or both? (3) Does the disclosure cause congestion at
high-quality sellers? I use this analysis of the eect of ratings on wait times to understand
who are the winners and losers of quality disclosure.

Inputs to Health

Many critics of disclosing doctor scores online claim that star ratings are uncorrelated with
true provider quality, or worse, that ratings or report cards cause doctors to shift eort
towards activity with low medical value but high rating value (such as putting sh tanks in
a waiting room in order to receive favorable reviews). Doctors at the health system often
complain to their administration about having scores posted online.

(The most frequent

critics are the low-rated providers.) The concern about providers reallocating eort towards
tasks based on alternative performance measures is detailed extensively by Feng Lu (2012)
in the framework of a multitasking agency problem. I assess whether this is occurring in my
setting by measuring whether highly rated doctors supply greater levels of inputs to health.

The health system uses nine metrics to assess primary care quality; I study whether the
highly scoring doctors in the online ratings also score highly on these nine internal quality
metrics.

The metrics are known as process measures, which is one of three types of per-

formance metrics in the taxonomy created by Avedis Donabedian, the other types being
outcome metrics and input metricss (Dranove, 2011). Outcome metrics (e.g., mortality) are
challenging to use for evaluating primary care because the eects of primary care may be
dicult to observe in the short run, and inputs (stang ratios, hours of training) may be
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uncorrelated with actual desired results. Process measures, such as whether the providers
use accepted practices and follow guidelines, are certainly not perfect measures of quality,
but are nonetheless helpful tools to evaluate whether the providers are supplying commonlyaccepted inputs to health. I rely on such process measures.

The nine metrics the health system evaluates are: frequency of BMI counseling, cervical
cancer screenings, colorectal cancer screenings, diabetes management care, hypertension
management care, mammography, pneumococcal vaccination, and 6- and 12-month depression followups. Doctor performance on these metrics is measured only for clinically eligible
patients (e.g., the mammography denominator is based only on women withing the age
range of government mammography guidelines). I compare the propensity of a doctor to
undertake recommended medical care to their average star rating.

The relationships are

plotted in Figure 1.5; the best t line is plotted over a binned scatterplot of the data.

For all nine of the process metrics, higher-rated providers are also supplying greater inputs to
health. Note that the binned scatterplots are tighter and steeper for the cancer screenings
and vaccination relative to the BMI, hypertension, and diabetes counseling scatterplots.
This suggests a stronger relationship between process metrics and quality score in settings
where doctors alone have greater control over inputs to health relative to settings that are
more jointly determined by provider inputs as well as patient lifestyle and behavior such
as weight and blood pressure. The overall slopes are consistent with Perez and Freedman
(2018), who nd that best-ranked hospitals had better clinical quality scores than worst
ranked hospitals.

In sum, I conclude based on these relationships that in addition to disclosure shifting patients
to higher-rated providers, disclosure is shifting patients to providers who supply greater
inputs to health, on average.
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Is Disclosure Causing Market Expansion or Switching?

Is the demand response to quality disclosure primarily having an eect on patients who
are brand-new to the health system, or is the eect concentrated among switchers, those
who choose new doctors but have already sought care from other providers within the health
system? I investigate this question to better understand whether quality disclosure primarily
causes a market expansion or a reallocation of established patients. It is possible that both
occur.

To dierentiate across this dimension, I use the EHR data to identify brand-new

patients to the health system (which I label

de novo

patients) versus established patients

(new patients to a particular doctor, but not to the health system). The EHR data extract
that I have does not have an indicator for

de novo

patients, but does have an indicator for

patients who are new to a particular provider. I use a three-pronged data-driven method
to identify

de novo

visits.

The visits must be (1) the patients' rst recorded visit in the

entire extract of the EHR I have access to (2017-2019); (2) agged as a new visit for the
particular doctor, meaning even if it is the patient's earliest occurrence in the EHR le, but
it is not a new visit with that particular provider, it does not count as

de novo ;

and (3)

after November 2018, which creates a nearly 2-year window in which the patient did not
appear in the EHR at all before their rst appearance. These rules are meant to prevent
as many patients who had already visited other health system doctors from inadvertently
getting classied as

de novo.

A patient could have seen a health system doctor in 2015

(before my data window) and had a subsequent rst visit with any provider after November
2018, but I think this gap would be unlikely.

The results of this market expansion versus market stealing breakdown are displayed in
Figure 1.6.

This gure shows that patients who already had previous contact with the

health system, but with dierent providers, are driving the response to quality disclosure
rather than

de novo

patients. In Appendix Table A2, I estimate that the additional new

patients a provider sees per month who are switching from other health system providers
increases by 2.059 new patients per month (e.g., 60% increase on a baseline of 3.454 found
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in column 4). However, for

de novo

new patients (those who have never been to any doctor

at the health system, I do not observe a statistically signicant increase in the number of
new patients a provider sees if they have a higher rating due to rounding (Appendix Table
A3).

I view Figure 1.6 and Tables A2 and A3 as suggestive evidence that the response to demand
occurs mainly along the margin of switching, causing a reallocation of previously existing
patients towards physicians and other providers who are rated more highly in terms of
quality scores.

Wait Times and the Price of a Star

In this section, I explore the causal eects of quality disclosure on congestion. In doing so,
I link my empirical results to the theoretical model by examining wait times. Wait times
may play a role in rationing scarce quality because health care is dierent from conventional
product markets in part due to the presence of third-party payors (insurers).

Because

patients can often face the same price for care from any provider in their insurance network,
there is no direct out-of-pocket price that can easily vary in physician quality. This directly
contrasts with conventional products, where sellers can immediately raise (or lower) prices
in response to a high (or low) quality score when scores are disclosed.

14

To motivate the possible role that wait times have in equilibrating supply and demand after
ratings disclosure, I rst focus on conventional product markets as a benchmark. In the case
of conventional products, Wolinsky (1983) models an equilibrium where individual sellers set
prices in response to buyers' expectations of quality. In that model, Wolinsky establishes
a separating equilibrium where each price signals a unique level of quality.

In contrast,

health care providers do not have any way to adjust prices paid by consumers in the short
run after disclosure. Conditional on service line (e.g., family medicine) and insurance plan

14

For example, sellers can immediately raise or lower prices in response to changes in ratings on the online

tutoring platform www.wyzant.com, where sellers name their own prices and star ratings are a salient part
of product search.
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membership, patients at the integrated health system pay the same amount out-of-pocket
and have the same access to the same set of doctors. In sum, at the point-of-sale to a patient,
the patient eectively pays the same out-of-pocket price for any primary care provider they
see, regardless of the quality rating of a provider.

High-quality providers cannot charge

patients more based on their high rating (or any other factor). Of course, physicians could
always leave the system, but in the short run, the patient does not face a higher price for
quality and capacity and entry are xed.

Does the market have any way to nd equilibrium in the absence of a monetary price for
dierential quality? Richards-Shubik et al. (2021) suggests that congestion (or wait times)
play a similar role to prices in such markets. I evaluate this hypothesis by studying wait
times, measured in the number of days between when an appointment is booked and when
that appointment takes place.

For each outpatient visit with family medicine providers, I compute the total number of
days that the patient waited for care (using the EHR data to gather the number of days
between when an appointment is entered into the system and when it occurs).

I make a

few sample restrictions. First, I exclude from the data all visits that occur more than 180
days after they are scheduled, as these represent visits for which patients do not likely care
about wait time to see a doctor (there is a small mass of visits that are scheduled exactly
one year out). Second, I drop visits that occurred at a walk-in clinic (as the patient might
not have a choice of a particular provider); individuals less than 18 years old; visits where
the ag for the visit being new to a provider was not present (primarily post August 2019);
and visits when the wait time was coded in error as being less than 0 days.

To identify the causal eect of ratings on wait time, I exploit both the variation induced
by rounding ratings to the nearest tenth as well as the variation in timing of pre- vs. postdisclosure of quality scores to estimate both a regression discontinuity model as well as a
dierence-in-discontinuity model in the spirit of the identication strategy laid out in Section
5. These models assess whether patients wait longer to see a provider with a higher rating.
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The regression is similar to the model estimated in Tables 3 and 4, but run at the individual
level rather than provider-month level, and I also include a diagnosis code xed eect (using
the primary ICD9 code for the visit) because the patient's type of medical condition when
arriving at the doctor might dictate how quickly the provider moves them to the front of the
line. For the specications presented in Table 10, I restrict the bandwidth to 0.025 on both
sides of the cuto of the normalized running variable, and report robust standard errors.

The results in Table 1.10 show that a higher star rating causes new patients to wait longer to
receive care. Column 1 of Table 1.10 presents the pre-disclosure (placebo) regression discontinuity specication which nds no increase in wait times (statistically indistinguishable from
zero). Column 2, the regression discontinuity specication that relies only on post-disclosure
data, shows an eect of 2.105 additional days on a baseline of 8.765 (24.0%). Finally, the
dierence-in-discontinuities (Column 3) shows that a higher star rating causes new patients
to wait 2.695 days longer to receive care relative to a baseline of 8.848 days (a 30.5% increase).
In Appendix Table A4, I perform a barrage of robustness tests regarding these specications. First, in the spirit of Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Eggers and Hainmueller (2009),
I test for jumps at non-discontinuity points. I construct two false placebo thresholds in
the running variable, at -0.025 and 0.025 instead of 0, and nd no statistically signicant
increase in wait time at these placebo points (this is true both during the disclosure period
as well as prior to the disclosure period). For the true discontinuity (0.00 from the rounding threshold) during the period that the ratings were public online, I nd a statistically
signicant increase in the wait time for new adult patients of 2.450 days; however, there is no
statistically signicant dierence at the true discontinuity during the pre-disclosure period
(as expected). To further ensure that I am picking up a causal eect, these robustness test
regressions are estimated by rst residualizing wait time on cuto xed eects and ICD-9
xed eects and then estimating optimal bandwidth local linear regression (Calonico et al.,

15 The optimal-bandwidth residualized binned scatterplots with local linear regression

2017).

best t lines for the pre-disclosure period and post-disclosure period are found in Appendix

15

I use the

rdrobust

and

rdplot

packages in Stata.
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Figures A4 and A5, respectively, and illustrate an increase in wait times at higher rated
physicians occurring when quality ratings are disclosed but not before.

I interpret this nding to represent a shadow price of a star.

That is, new patients are

willing to wait 30.5% longer to get care from a physician who has a one-increment increase
in their quality score (e.g., the eect of moving from a 4.7 to a 4.8). Furthermore, I can extrapolate this estimate to calculate how much patients are willing to wait for a one standard
deviation increase in quality. If I make the assumption that the eect size scales linearly as
ratings increase, my estimate of a willingness-to-wait of 2.695 wait days for a 0.1 star increase
represents a 3.05-day willingness-to-wait for a standard deviation increase in star rating (st.
dev = 0.13).

I argue that the wait time shadow price of a star operates similarly to a

traditional price by helping supply and demand clear in this market. This market-clearing
role of wait times, in which a higher-rated physician costs more in terms of number of days
a patient must wait, helps facilitate equilibrium because if patients are heterogenous in their
willingness-to-wait (just like patients may be heterogeneous in willingness-to-pay for conventional products), an equilibrium queue may emerge in the spirit of Lindsay and Feigenbaum
(1984). Here, sorting occurs on the basis of underlying valuation of quality, and disclosure

16

creates a market for physician quality which did not exist in the absence of ratings.

In addition to examining the eect of a quality score on new patients' willingness to wait for
care, I also investigate what happens to wait times for established patients when a provider's
quality score increases. I previously showed that an increase in a providers' rating causes
more new patients to see that provider. This creates congestion for established patients. In
Table 1.11, I show that established patients wait longer to receive care from a doctor with a
higher quality score. Columns 1 and 2 show pre- and post-disclosure regression discontinuity
estimates, and column 3 shows an eect of a 1.736 day increase in wait times on a baseline

16

People willing to wait longer may have less acute needs and one possible implication is that quality

disclosure with wait times as shadow prices could lead to suboptimal allocation of resources.

However,

disclosure without price adjustment may lead to more equitable allocation compared to disclosure where
prices can respond depending on the relative distributions of willingness-to-pay versus willingness-to-wait in
the population.
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of 12.8 days (12% increase). Because these patients are not shopping for a new provider, I
interpret this to be evidence of congestion spillovers: If capacity of family medicine providers
is restricted in the short run, since additional patients visit providers due to higher ratings,
the established patients face congestion.

Clearly, these patients suer as a result of the

quality disclosure. They were already seeing the higher-rated doctor, but disclosure causes
them to wait longer for care because newer patients are now sorting to that doctor, as well.

I also explore whether the congestion eects of star ratings diers by the urgency of the
patient's medical condition.

From a high-level perspective, if patients wait longer to see

family doctors with higher star ratings, all else equal, and lower star rating doctors have
excess capacity (or slack) because of this additional volume at higher-rated doctors, it
could be inecient for patients to wait longer for conditions that might end them up in
the emergency department.

Using the decomposition between productive and allocative

eciency (for example, see Baicker and Chandra (2011)), I note that it may be ecient
from the perspective of the health system for patients to wait longer for a physician with
a higher star rating for non-urgent conditions like a checkup but not for urgent conditions.
Perhaps the preferences of the patient for a checkup from a higher-rated physician are such
that they are willing to wait longer, and there is little eciency cost to this additional
waiting which reects a revealed preference argument about patient choices.

However, if

patients are waiting longer for care that is urgent in search of a higher star (such as care
that would wind them up in the emergency room if not treated quickly), then it might be
productively inecient for these patients to be reallocated or sorted to doctors with excess
availability.

I test this by restricting to a subset of cases where patients are seeking care from family
medicine doctors where ED care might be needed but is preventable or avoidable. I use a taxonomy of diagnosis codes developed from an algorithm developed by John Billings at NYU
Wagner.

17

17 In Table 1.12, I show that patients are willing to wait longer for avoidable ED

Available here: https://web.archive.org/web/20160313195339/https://wagner.nyu.edu/faculty/billings/nyued-

background
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care when star ratings are disclosed (but not before) using the same regression-discontinuity
design as before.

When stars are disclosed (column 2), patients are willing to wait 2.37

additional days for a higher-rated physician when they are seeking care that the Billings, et.
al. algorithm would consider to be urgent where ED care may be needed but is preventable
or avoidable. If these patients were simply reallocated to doctors with lower stars who had
excess capacity, it may lead to an eciency improvement from the perspective of the health
system.

It is important to note that congestion in the absence of a price does not imply ineciency;
in fact, as I detail in my model section, congestion can serve a role to help clear the market,
allocating resources across various individuals who dier by willingness-to-wait.

In conclusion, this congestion eect (and willingness-to-wait for quality) is informative in
explaining how quality disclosure operates in markets with limited ability to adjust prices.
How is equilibrium reached? Sorting patients based on willingness-to-wait for quality is one
way in which this market can reach equilibrium in the absence of a price. The ability of this
market to reach equilibrium may be dependent on sorting based on willingness to wait for
quality.

1.6.4. Robustness

In this section, I present a number of robustness checks. I address potential pitfalls relating
to the bandwidth used for the regression discontinuity estimates, to the functional form
of the running variable, and to the use of local linear regression. I also test for covariate
balance. I nd that the results are robust to these tests; although my point estimates very
minimally across some specications, the direction and magnitude of my estimates holds up
under the barrage of traditional regression discontinuity robustness tests.

18

18

In fact, the rst robustness check is seen in the presentation of Table 1.3, where I show that the results of

the baseline regression discontinuity model are invariant to linear, quadratic, or cubic polynomial functional
form.
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Bandwidth

To check that the regression results above are not sensitive to proximity to the cuto and
choices of the econometrician, I vary the bandwidth under which data is included in the
regression discontinuity.

Because regression discontinuity models are identied locally at

the jump in the conditional function of the running variable, data far from the discontinuity
can lead to biased estimates (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).

However, the more I restrict to a

very narrow bandwidth around the discontinuity, the less data is available for estimation.
Accordingly, adjusting the bandwidth induces a bias-variance tradeo.

The results hold as I increasingly restrict the bandwidth (see Table 1.13). I plot the coecients and standard errors for the baseline specication causal eect as I vary the bandwidth
used in estimation from (-.05,.05) to (-.01,.01) in Figure 1.7. I nd that the results are insensitive to adjustment in bandwidth size. (As bandwidths decrease, there is less data on
which to estimate, so condence intervals widen slightly.) However, the overall results are
invariant to bandwidth variation. I also plot the optimal bandwidth selected by the routine
of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014), denoted by the dashed line labeled CCT.

Manipulation, Density Tests and Alternative Sample Denitions

A concern in regression discontinuity design studies is that there is precise manipulation
of the running variable by agents who want to be on a certain side of a cuto.

From a

high-level perspective, I do not think this is likely a problem in this setting, since a provider
would have considerable diculty in manipulating their rating to be rounded up or down.
Why? Because provider surveys are sent randomly and submitted by only a small number of
patients, and a provider would have no way of knowing

ex ante

which patient would receive

and ultimately submit a survey. Accordingly, they would have to exert eort on every single
patient in order to be on a given side of the threshold (rounded up). Also, providers do not
know their own distance from the threshold during the time period I study. (After my study
window ended, providers were made known about their current raw underlying rating, but
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during my data availability, providers had no way of knowing if they were close to being
rounded up or far from the threshold.) Nonetheless, to test for manipulation of the running
variable, I plot the density of the running variable in discrete bins on both sides of the
threshold in the spirit of McCrary (2008).

Appendix Figures A6 and A7 show that there is no discontinuity in the density of the
running variable (quality rating on the 15th day of the month) that would suggest bunching
on one distinct side of the threshold. Figure A6 plots this histogram for

all

the providers

in the data, where Figure A7 plots the density for the subsample of providers who have
only a single disclosed score in a given month and do not have multiple scores in a given
month. Although the density is symmetric around the threshold in both settings, there is
a symmetric dip in the number of providers very close to the threshold in Figure A7. This
dip is explained by fact that providers with more than one rating a month (say, who show
both a 4.7 and 4.8) are likely to have a closer score to the rounding threshold given that
they crossed it.

As an additional robustness check to make sure that the baseline regression results are robust
to not dropping the provider-months which cross the rounding threshold in a given month, I
plot the regression discontinuity results and report regression tables for the sample where I
do not drop these observations (Appendix Figure A8 and Appendix Table A5). The results
are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the baseline specication.

As mentioned in footnote 10, as an additional robustness check, I estimate the main baseline
regression discontinuity model (number of new visits per month)

without

including cuto

specic xed eects, which results in a coecient which can be interpreted as a double
average, the weighted average across cutos of the local average treatment eect for all
units facing each particular cuto value, giving higher weights to the particular cutos
that are most observed in the data set. Table A7 shows the estimates from the Rounded
Up coecient of interest for the same six baseline specications as the cuto-specic xed
eects model found in Table 1.3.

The estimates are comparable in both magnitude and
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direction across all specications.

Covariate Balance

In Appendix Figure A9, I show that based on observable predetermined characteristics,
physicians with ratings that are rounded up display no dierent qualities than those just
rounded down. I include these covariate balance tests for four predetermined attributes in
the providermonth panel (the probability a physician is male, the probability the provider
is an MD, the probability they are employed in a high density of provider market [using
the denitions from section 6.2.4] and the elapsed years since that provider started working
at the health system).

Figure A9 shows covariate balance across each of these available

predetermined attributes.

Appendix Table A6 shows the regression estimates from these

covariate balance tests. Physicians with ratings rounded up seem to be no dierent than
physicians with ratings rounded down based on available predetermined observables.

Weighting & the Signicance of Number of Reviews

I also show my results are robust to whether or not I weight the observations by rating count
in addition to varying the bandwidths and global polynomials in Table 1.14. Following the
practice of Magnusson (2019), I estimate the baseline specication unweighted, weighted
by count of ratings, and weighted by inverse rating count. Weighting by count allows the
providers with more precise information signals due to more scores reported on the website to
reect that precision, whereas weighting by inverse count allows providers with fewer ratings
(and less precision of signal) to count for more. I nd that the results are as expected: count
ratings show a stronger causal eect, and inverse count ratings shrink the eect towards the
null. Unless otherwise indicated, throughout this paper, weighted estimates are shown, as a
higher count of reviews may reect a higher level of information available to consumers (in
the spirit of Bayesian updating).
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1.7. Discussion
1.7.1. Limitations

In this paper, I use a physician-level star rating disclosure policy at a large midwestern
health care system to study the eects of quality disclosure on economically meaningful
outcomes such as demand, sorting, and congestion. Using a regression discontinuity design,
I nd that quality disclosure caused a response in the quantity demanded of highly rated
physicians, leading to a 2.96 new patient per month increase caused by an additional tenth
of a star. I also nd that the demand response was heterogenous across provider specialty
and age, among other dimensions, as well as nding that disclosure caused longer wait times
at higher rated physicians.

This study is not without limitations, however. First and foremost, I do not have data on
many dimensions of physician behavioral response to ratings disclosure that would allow
me to identify a supply response on the part of physicians.

For example, I am not able

to ascertain if physicians substituted to providing dierent services that patients might
demand. A common concern is that patients could reward physicians by leaving high ratings
for providing medically unnecessary services, such as prescribing antibiotics for ear infections
when antibiotics are not helpful or even harmful (Martinez et al., 2018). Because my data
set does not have granular procedure code data about what treatments physicians performed,
I am not able to test whether physicians responded to quality disclosure by altering the type
or quality of care they provide or by adjusting across dierent dimensions of quality.

Another limitation to this paper is that I do not have longitudinal data on physician rates
of screenings, vaccinations, and counseling services.

The analysis displayed in Figure 1.5

could be more informative about the causal eect of rating disclosure on these services
had I been able to construct a panel over time of physician propensity to supply inputs
to health.

Because I only have a single snapshot of physician screening and vaccination

rates to provide these services but ratings uctuate over time, I cannot estimate regression
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discontinuity models using these outcomes in the same sense as in other sections of the paper.
Furthermore, as is common in papers studying the impacts of family medicine, it is dicult
to observe direct health outcomes as compared to specialties such as cardiac surgery, where
mortality and adverse events are far more common. Nonetheless, despite these limitations,
I show that ratings, which cause changes in demand, also shift patients to doctors who, on
average, perform more of these medically recommended services.

Lastly, these results may not generalize to other populations that may dier demographically or in their propensity to use quality information to search for physicians. Although
generalizability is a possible concern (the large Midwestern health system cares for a population that is more White and more rural than the United States as a whole), I nevertheless
note that this is an ideal population to study the questions posed in this paper. First, the
system covers a broad geographic and demographic area (four states with both rural and
urban areas). Second, the advantages to studying the impacts of quality disclosure in my
setting, where quality disclosure is mandatory, where patients face the same price for any
provider, and where there is unique pre- and post-disclosure data, suggests that my setting
is an ideal laboratory for this study.

1.7.2. Conclusion

In this paper, I provide new evidence on the causal eects of star rating disclosure on demand,
sorting, and congestion in markets where prices cannot readily adjust to new information
about quality. I leverage a unique institutional environment and a causal framework to show
that demand is responsive to medical provider star ratings and that ratings sort patients to
higher-quality providers.

I nd a 54% increase in new patient visits caused by a provider having their rating rounded
up relative to rounded down. I explore the drivers of this demand response by addressing
heterogeneity, such as age, health status, and provider type.

Younger patients are more

responsive than older patients (75% increase in new visit volume by 18- to 34-year-olds
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relative to 58% by 60- to 64-year-olds), perhaps because the younger patients are more
accustomed to seeking quality information on the internet, and sicker patients are more
responsive than healthy patients, perhaps due to sicker patients placing a greater value
on physician quality.

I show that disclosure shifted volume to providers who on average

produce greater levels of medically recommended inputs to health (screenings, counseling,
and vaccinations), and I show that a higher online rating also causes increased wait times at a
provider. New patients wait 30.5% longer for a doctor with a higher rating and established
patients wait longer, too (12.6% longer).

These results are consistent with my model of

congestion eects in which wait times serve as a shadow price for quality and equilibrate
the market.

Taking all the evidence together, quality disclosure appears to facilitate an equilibrium
outcome in which patients actively look for information about product quality, in which
they act on that information by substituting to higher-rated and higher-quality sellers, and
select an experience good based on their willingness to pay (wait) for quality.

Using the

reduced form estimates and extrapolating to a one-standard deviation increase in quality, I
estimate the shadow price of a star is that consumers are willing to wait 3 additional days
for a one standard deviation increase in quality. I argue that this shadow price facilitates
equilibrium market clearing in a setting where price dierences are unable to do so.

My results shed light on the complex role that quality disclosure plays in market outcomes,
particularly in the market for health care and other insured products where prices cannot
immediately vary after disclosure.

Many health systems have adopted quality ratings in

the past decade, and business leaders (e.g., hospital management) along with policymakers
continue to focus on expanding the scope of physician ratings. Understanding the eects
of star rating disclosure on such markets is key to designing, implementing, and evaluating
policies meant to x market imperfections by improving patient access to information about
quality. This paper contributes to the growing body of empirical literature on information
disclosure by providing novel evidence about information's eect on non-price markets and
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these results inform scholars as well as policymakers about the equilibrium eects of quality
disclosure.

1.8. Tables & Figures
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics

Patient Level

Mean

Median

SD
24.49

Age

38.76

36.86

BMI

27.51

26.98

8.26

118.87

119.45

13.83

72.06

72.00

9.27

B.P. (systolic)
B.P. (diastolic)
Race = White
N (Visits)
N (Patients)

Provider-Month Level
Monthly New Visits
Monthly Visits
Rating Score (continuous)

0.89
12,575,190
998,244

Mean

Median

SD

7.34

4.00

10.08

178.48

172.00

94.34

4.78

4.82

0.13

Rating Count (Dec '18)

228.55

206.50

127.30

Rating Count (Aug '19)

298.28

264.00

171.59

Physicians share (MD/DO)

0.55

Mid-level practitioner share

0.45

Distinct providers
N (Provider-Months)

340
2,730
7

Note: Patient level data comes from EHR and provider-month data comes from the EHR
merged with the ratings data. Providermonth level data is restricted to family medicine
providers only.
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Table 1.2: Outcome: Monthly New Visits (OLS)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Displayed Rating Score
(...,4.5,4.6,4.7,...)

-16.48

∗∗∗

(3.365)

∗∗∗

-16.52

(3.369)

∗∗∗

∗∗∗

-16.67

-16.71

(3.614)

(3.619)

X

X

2,730

2,730

Controls:
Month-Year FE

X

X

Professional Credential FE
Observations

2,730

2,730

Note: Standard Errors clustered at the provider level and observations weighted by
review count. Restricted to Family Medicine providers. Professional Credential FEs
include MD, PA, CNP, APR, DO, and other professional credentials.
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Table 1.3: Monthly New Visits - Family Medicine
(1)
Rounded Up

2.978

(2)

∗∗

(3)

∗∗

(4)

∗∗

(5)

∗∗

(6)

∗∗

∗∗

2.958

3.850

2.956

4.287

5.550

(1.347)

(1.336)

(1.542)

(1.332)

(1.738)

(2.352)

Linear

Quad.

Cubic

Linear

Quad.

Cubic

Treatment Interaction

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Cuto FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Functional Form:

Mean Below Threshold

5.475

5.475

5.475

5.475

5.475

5.475

% Change

54.4

54.0

70.3

54.0

78.3

101.4

Observations

2730

2730

2730

2730

2730

2730

Note: Standard Errors clustered at the provider level and observations weighted by review
count. Treatment Interaction refers to an indicator permitting dierent slopes on each side
of the discontinuty.
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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Table 1.4: Dierence-in-Discontinuities

New Visits per Month

∗∗∗

Post x Rounded Up

4.496

(1.244)
Rounded Up

-1.414
(0.899)

Distance to threshold

19.38
(20.37)

Dist x Rounded Up

-36.53
(28.10)

Post

-0.940
(0.713)

∗

Post x Distance

-46.15

(26.96)
Post x Dist x Rounded

0.689
(45.41)

Mean below threshold

5.100

% Change

88.2

Observations

7762

Standard errors clustered at the provider level.
and observations weighted by count. Restricted to
family medicine providers and specication is
linear with interaction. See text for pre/post dates.
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: Monthly New Visits - By Leading 5 Specialties
(1)
Family Med
Rounded Up

Dist

×

Rounded

Mean below threshold

Pediatrics

Internal Med

0.0532

-3.983

(1.332)

(1.394)

(2.271)

∗

(4)

(5)

Cancer

OB/GYN

2.055

-2.086

(3.219)

(2.231)

-26.92

17.80

-22.07

-16.42

-50.78

(24.86)

(28.06)

(61.38)

(94.48)

(102.6)

54.79

-113.9

134.4

-35.84

Cuto FEs

(3)

∗∗

2.956

Distance to threshold

(2)

-94.96

∗

(45.82)

(51.64)

(94.15)

(141.2)

(156.8)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

5.475

4.805

5.914

14.664

14.060

% Change

54.0

1.1

-67.3

14.0

-14.8

Observations

2730

983

529

657

499

Standard errors clustered at the provider level & observations weighted by count.
Preferred specication is linear trend plus interaction. Bandwidth (-.05,.05)
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Monthly New Visits - By Patient Age Groups
(1)

(2)

Age 18-34

∗∗

Rounded Up

Distance to threshold

Dist

×

Rounded

Cuto FEs
Mean below threshold

(3)

Age 35-49

∗∗

(4)

Age 50-64

∗∗

(5)

Age 65-79

∗∗

Age 80+

1.194

0.688

0.593

0.291

0.0881

(0.535)

(0.321)

(0.268)

(0.134)

-11.72

-4.922

-7.703

-4.601

(7.630)

(5.488)

(5.002)

(3.129)

(1.293)

-16.02

-10.95

-5.895

1.034

1.549

(15.63)

(11.11)

(9.022)

(4.837)

(2.205)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

(0.0616)

∗∗

-2.570

1.576

1.105

1.020

0.479

0.165

% change

75.8

62.2

58.2

60.8

53.4

Observations

2529

2529

2529

2529

2529

Standard errors clustered at the provider level & observations weighted by count.
Preferred specication is linear trend plus interaction.
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: Monthly New Visits - By Patient Health Status
Healthy

Distance to threshold

Dist

×

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Zero Comorb.

Non-Obese

Nonmoker

Comorbid

Obese

Smoker

∗∗

Rounded Up

Rounded

Cuto FEs
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Mean below threshold

Sick

∗∗

∗∗

∗∗

2.867

1.952

2.337

0.357

(1.227)

(0.974)

(0.997)

(0.160)

-38.28

-25.32

(24.23)

(19.34)

∗

-34.37

(20.23)

-4.022
(3.352)

∗∗∗

1.271

(0.453)

∗∗

-16.99

(8.497)

∗∗

0.887

(0.414)
-7.933
(8.244)

-15.29

-10.86

-7.786

-4.661

-9.095

-12.16

(42.99)

(33.43)

(36.13)

(5.978)

(16.31)

(13.50)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

5.303

4.082

4.206

0.558

1.780

1.655

% Change

54.1

47.8

55.5

63.9

71.4

53.6

Observations

2529

2529

2529

2529

2529

2529

Standard errors clustered at the provider level & observations weighted by count.
Preferred specication is linear trend plus interaction.
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Table 1.8: Monthly New Visits - By Provider Credentials
(1)

(2)

MDs

∗∗

Rounded Up

4.203

(1.981)
Distance to threshold

Not MDs
0.506
(1.838)

-11.39

-20.86

(31.76)

(40.00)

-75.87

-10.09

(62.48)

(68.77)

Yes

Yes

Mean below threshold

4.120

7.847

% Change

102.0

6.5

Observations

1363

1367

Dist

×

Rounded

Cuto FEs

SEs clustered at the provider level
Weighted by rating count. Bandwidth (-.05,.05).
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗
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p < 0.01

Table 1.9: Monlthy New Visits, by Geographic Density of Family Medicine Providers

Rounded Up

×

(2)

Low Density

High Density

1.927

Distance to threshold

Dist

(1)

Rounded

Cuto FEs
Mean below threshold

4.079

∗

(3)

(4)

Low Density

High Density

2.166

∗∗∗

4.769

(1.495)

(2.393)

(1.859)

(1.692)

-26.12

-35.75

-49.54

(37.17)

(36.38)

(41.97)

(30.23)

0.241

-56.49

9.092

-21.20

(63.18)

(70.21)

(70.04)

(58.62)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

∗

-52.51

5.864

5.705

5.864

5.705

% Change

32.9

71.5

36.9

83.6

Observations

1389

1186

1361

1214

Note: Standard Errors clustered at the provider level and observations weighted by review count.
Columns 1-2 compute physician density using all physicians included in the Area Health Resource
File, and columns 3-4 use only health system physicians. Density calculations explained in
section 6.2.4. Model includes cuto FEs.
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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Table 1.10: Wait Days for Appointment, New Patients
(1)

(2)

(3)

Pre-info

Post-info

Di-in-Disc

∗∗∗

Post x Rounded Up

2.695

(0.886)
Rounded Up

-0.850

Distance to threshold

Dist x Rounded Up

2.105

∗∗∗

-0.847

(0.612)

(0.704)

(0.593)

37.17

-3.134

42.11

(29.22)

(35.38)

(28.17)

-43.02

-71.44

-51.67

(40.93)

(50.15)

(39.47)

Post

-1.224

∗∗

(0.611)
Post x Distance

-52.69
(42.68)

Post x Dist x Rounded

1.310
(60.77)

Cuto FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

ICD Diagnosis Code FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

8.896

8.765

8.848

Mean below threshold
% Change
Observations

-9.6

24.0

30.5

13300

8745

22045

Unit of observation is a patient visit. Restricted to Family Medicine
specialty, patients 18+, and dropping new visits scheduled greater
than 180 days out. Regression is unweighted and inference is done with
robust standard errors and bandwidth is [-.025,.025].
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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Table 1.11: Wait Days for Appointment, Established Patients
(1)

(2)

(3)

Pre-info

Post-info

Di-in-Disc

∗∗∗

Post x Rounded Up

1.736

(0.240)

∗∗∗

Rounded Up

-0.549

(0.132)
Distance to threshold

42.34

∗∗∗

(6.425)

∗∗∗

Dist x Rounded Up

-50.01

(9.055)

∗∗∗

1.163

(0.203)

∗∗∗

-36.35

(10.01)

∗∗∗

43.14

(14.26)

Post

∗∗∗

-0.547

(0.131)

∗∗∗

45.23

(6.401)

∗∗∗

-50.76

(9.025)
-0.858

∗∗∗

(0.171)
Post x Distance

-94.30

∗∗∗

(11.76)

∗∗∗

Post x Dist x Rounded

101.4

(16.73)
Cuto FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

ICD Diagnosis Code FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

13.462

14.513

13.793

Mean below threshold
% Change
Observations

-4.1

8.0

12.6

448285

205788

654073

Unit of observation is a patient visit. Restricted to Family Medicine
specialty, patients 18+, and dropping new visits scheduled greater
than 180 days out. Regression is unweighted and inference is done with
robust standard errors and bandwidth is [-.025,.025].
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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Table 1.12: Wait Days for Urgent Conditions

Rounded Up

(1)

(2)

Pre-Disclosure

Post-Disclosure

∗∗

-0.771

2.374

(1.090)
Distance to threshold

Distance X Rounded

35.36

(1.096)

∗∗

-165.9

(65.34)

(82.94)

-40.76

132.2

(71.19)

(99.88)

Cuto FEs

Yes

Yes

ICD FEs

Yes

Yes

1124

650

Observations

Wait Time (residualized) for conditions indicated by
Billings, et al. (2000) to be ED Care Needed
but Preventable/Avoidable
Preferred specication is linear trend plus interaction.
Bandwidth (-.05,.05) and robust SEs.
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

63

Table 1.13: Monthly New Visits - Observations Restriction to Specied Distance from Cuto
(1)

(2)

(-0.05,0.05)

∗∗

Rounded Up

Distance to threshold

Dist

×

Rounded

Cuto FEs
Mean below threshold

(-0.04,0.04)

∗∗

2.956

2.810

(1.332)

(1.409)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(-0.03,0.03)

(-0.02,0.02)

(-0.01,0.01)

∗∗∗

4.197

(1.450)

∗∗∗

4.603

(1.663)

∗∗

4.389

(1.699)

-26.92

-30.79

-111.0

-83.52

-180.6

(24.86)

(36.07)

(75.10)

(77.04)

(126.0)

-35.84

-17.80

35.27

-50.41

210.0

(45.82)

(62.75)

(98.74)

(137.0)

(217.7)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

5.475

5.457

5.901

5.427

5.052

% Change

54.0

51.5

71.1

84.8

86.9

Observations

2730

2204

1611

987

440

Standard errors clustered at the provider level & observations weighted
by rating count. Specication is linear trend plus interaction.
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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Table 1.14: Monthly New Visits - Family Medicine: Eect of Weighting by Rating Count

Rounded Up

(1) No

(2) Weight

(3) Weight

(4) No

(5) Weight

(6) Weight

Weighting

by Count

by Inv Count

Weighting

by Count

by Inv Count

2.978

∗∗

(1.468)
Distance to threshold

Dist

×

∗

∗∗

∗

Mean below threshold

∗∗

∗

5.704

2.943

2.956

5.602

(1.347)

(3.150)

(1.442)

(1.332)

(3.022)

∗∗

-40.21

-45.83

(21.85)

(21.35)

-58.90

-21.62

-26.92

-18.49

(36.37)

(29.06)

(24.86)

(42.65)

-35.71

-35.84

-78.12

Rounded

Cuto FEs

∗∗

2.978

(57.89)

(45.82)

(99.89)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

65

10.856

6.652

8.826

10.856

6.652

8.826

% Change

27.4

44.8

64.6

27.1

44.4

63.5

Observations

2730

2730

2730

2730

2730

2730

SEs clustered at the provider level. Cols. 1-3 are linear trend, 4-6 linear plus interaction.
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Figure 1.1: Distribution of Provider Average Ratings

Figure 1.2: Intuition of Identication Strategy

Although physicians A & B have similar raw ratings, the discrete rounding rule causes
physician A to be displayed with 4.7 stars and physician B to be displayed with 4.8 stars.
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Figure 1.3: Demand Response to Quality Disclosure

Note: Figure presents a binned scatterplot of the new visits per month at a family medicine
provider, given the distance of that provider to the nearest star rating rounding threshold.
Distances to nearest thresholds are pooled across the cutos and normalized to the nearest
threshold and observations are weighted by count of reviews. Superimposed on the binned
scatterplot are best-t linear regression lines on both sides of the cuto.
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Figure 1.4: Demand Response to Quality Disclosure, Dierence in Discontinuities

Note: Figure presents a binned scatterplot of the new visits per month at a family medicine
provider both before the online ratings were disclosed (red triangles) and after online ratings
were disclosed (blue dots), given the distance of that provider to the nearest star rating
rounding threshold. Distances to nearest rounding thresholds are pooled across the cutos
and normalized to the nearest threshold and observations are weighted by count of reviews.
Superimposed on the binned scatterplot are best-t linear regression lines on both sides
of the cuto for both pre-disclosure (January 2017 to October 2018) and post-disclosure
(December 2018 to August 2019) time windows.
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Figure 1.5: Relationship Between Star Ratings and Health Quality Metrics
(Vaccinations, Screenings, and Counseling)

Note: Six_mon_depr and Twelve_mon_depr correspond to 6- and 12-month depression
screenings.

Fraction (x-axis) corresponds to fraction of the time the provider performs

these vaccinations, screenings, and counseling on patients who are indicated for them. For
example, the denominator for mammography is only women in the age range recommended
by the government for mammography.

These quality metrics are used internally by the

health system to measure quality of family medicine. I only have one time period of these
provider quality metrics available, so I cannot exploit time variation in quality metrics to
estimate regression discontinuity models.

69

Figure 1.6: Market Expansion vs. Switching

Binned scatterplot of new visits per month at family medicine providers, separately by
whether the patient is

de novo

at the health system or already had exisiting exposure to

other providers in the health system.

Observations weighted by count.

disclosure period only.
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Data plots post-

Figure 1.7: Eects by Bandwidth

Note: Figure plots eect sizes from the baseline regression specication. Standard errors are
clustered on the provider. The red dashed line denotes the mean-squared-error minimizing
bandwidth of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (CCT).
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CHAPTER 2

Surprise, Out-of-Network Medical Bills and Arbitration:
An Economic Perspective

2.1. Introduction
A surprise medical bill is a bill that a patient receives from an out-of-network provider
who the patient did not know, or could not possibly have known, was out-of-network. One
such example may be if a radiologist reads an X-ray at an in-network hospital, but the
radiologist does not contract with the patient's insurance network. Previous work relying
on claims data suggests that these out-of-network surprise bills occur in approximately
20% of emergency visits (Cooper and Morton (2016); Garmon and Chartock (2017)).

If

one purpose of an insurance network is to direct patients to relatively high-value, low-cost
providers, yet patients are unable to observe

ex ante

which providers are in-network, the

ability of an insurance network to achieve that goal is blunted.

Accordingly, the lack of

consumer information about the network status of their providers could represent a market
failure where intervention may achieve desirable results.

19

In 2015, New York instituted a state law to hold patients harmless in the event of a surprise medical bill. The law created a mechanism for dispute resolution between insurers and
providers while holding the patient harmless. Procedurally, New York State implemented
nal-oer arbitration, where two parties each submit a single, binding oer to an independent arbitrator and that arbitrator may select one or the other party's oers but cannot split

19

One hypothesis is that the market could correct for this information problem via a repeated shopping

process by consumers. E.g., if a consumer has an adverse out-of-network billing experience at a particular
hospital, they may choose a dierent hospital the next time or share that experience, and the competitive
pressure for in-network hospitals to avoid surprise billing situations could drive down the problem of surprise
bills without regulatory intervention. Chartock et al. (2019) examine this issue and nd little evidence of
market correction of the surprise billing problem without regulatory intervention. They look at mothers who
give birth two times and the relative rates of switching between hospitals for the second birth conditional
on receiving a surprise bill in the initial birth. The likelihood of switching after a surprise bill in labor and
delivery is only slightly higher than the likelihood of switching in the absence of a surprise bill, suggesting
that a competitive, long-run market response to eliminate surprise bills is unlikely given the diculty of
consumers to shop with their feet.
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the dierence. This type of arbitration mechanism has been used to resolve labor disputes
(e.g., between police unions and local municipalities) as well as between Major League Baseball players and clubs (accordingly, nal-oer arbitration is also known as baseball-style
arbitration).

The New York law armed arbitrators with information about usual, customary, and reasonable (UCR) rates for a given service (procedure code) in a given area (3-digit zip code) from
FAIR Health, a health care benchmarking organization. FAIR Health dened the UCR rate
as the 80th percentile of provider charges in New York.

Other states soon followed New York in implementing nal-oer arbitration to resolve surprise medical bills.

New Jersey, Washington, Texas, and other states have all instituted

a version of nal-oer arbitration to resolve these bills with slightly dierent guidance to
arbitrators and slightly dierent procedures. After a long political debate, the United States
Congress passed the

No Surprises Act

in 2020 which instituted a nationwide nal-oer ar-

bitration mechanism to resolve these surprise bills, extending the patient protections to a
much wider swath of America.

There are a number of reasons to study nal-oer arbitration over surprise medical bills using
a formal economic framework. First, the number of arbitration proceedings, as well as the
dollar amounts of disputed bills, are quite large. For example, Texas had 44,910 requests
for arbitration in 2020 under their surprise bill law.

20 Second, beyond the magnitude of

the surprise billing disputes alone, studying arbitration is important because it impacts
beginning-of-the-year network formation between insurers and providers.

In the Nash-in-

Nash model of insurance network formation (e.g., Gowrisankaran et al. (2015); Ho and Lee
(2017)), a critical component to network participation is the disagreement payo  the
amount that the parties will earn if they do not form a network. Arbitration over surprise
bills aects this disagreement payo, which can shift around the incentives for network
formation Prager and Tilipman (2020). Lastly, nal-oer arbitration as a dispute resolution

20

https://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/documents/SB1264-2021-midyear-update.pdf
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mechanism is worthwhile of study in its own right. Understanding how this mechanism is
employed in health care may shed light on the use or non-use of arbitration in other disputes,
both legal and business-related.

In the following section, I introduce a model of nal-oer arbitration over surprise medical
bills and derive the equilibrium oers.

2.2. Model
2.2.1. Model Primatives

The simplest model of the nal-oer arbitration game for surprise medical bills has three
actors: an insurer, a provider, and an arbitrator.
Farber (1980).

Insurer

i

and provider

is characterized by an ideal wage,
provider know

wa

p

wa .

In this paper, I adapt the model from

submit oers,

wi

and

wp

to the arbitrator, who

The information structure is that the insurer and

only up to a distribution. For example, it is the case that the

No Surprises

Act gives the arbitrator authority to consider a number of factors including the median rates
for the disputed service along with information on certain additional circumstances about
the case.

The uncertainty as to how the arbitrator may rule gives rise to the spread of

the distribution of the random variable

wa .

I assume that the insurer and provider have

symmetric information about the arbitrators ideal outcome of a dispute, which may vary for
a number of reasons unknown to the parties. The insurer and provider know
a distribution with cumulative distribution function

wa

only up to

F (·).

The arbitrator, who is bound by the rules of the game to pick only among the two oers

wi

and

wp ,

cannot choose an amount in the middle. Denote what the arbitrator chooses as

y ∈ {wi , wa }.

The arbitrator is assumed to have utility that takes the form:

va (y, wa ) = −(y − wa )2

This implies that the arbitrator derives more utility the closer the selected oer is to the
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arbitrator's notion of an ideal settlement.

This utility function gives way to a natural decision rule: the arbitrator chooses the insurer's
oer,

wi , if and only if it is closer to the ideal payment for the surprise bill than the provider's

oer. The arbitrator chooses

wi

if and only if:

| wa − wi |≤| wp − wa |

In turn, this implies that the insurer's oer is accepted if

wa

is less than the average of the

oers:

wa ≤ (wi + wp )/2

What is the probability that the insurer's oer is chosen? Pr(Insurer Wins arbitration) =
Pr(wi )

= P r(wa ≤ (wi + wp )/2) = F ((wi + wp )/2) = F (w̄).

The expected payment in arbitration is accordingly:

wi P (wi ) + wp P (wp ) = wi F (w̄) + wp [1 − F (w̄)]

2.2.2. Nash Equilibrium Oers

The insurer seeks to

maximize
(wi∗ , wp∗ )

minimize

their payment. Dene the Nash equilibrium of this game to be the pair of oers

such that

wi∗

wp∗

solves:

min

wi · F ((wi + wp∗ )/2) + wp∗ · [1 − F ((wi + wp∗ )/2)]

max

wi∗ · F ((wi∗ + wp )/2) + wp · [1 − F ((wi∗ + wp )/2)]

wi

and

their payment to the provider, while the provider wants to

solves:

wp
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Solving for these simultaneous equations, one nds that

1

f

∗
w∗ +wp
i
2

.

F



wi∗ +wp∗
2



=

1
2 as well as

wp∗ −wi∗ =

The average of the two equilibrium oers in the median of the arbitrator's

preferred settlement. Furthermore, the dierence between the two equilibrium oers must
equal the value of the density function at the median of the arbitrator's preferred settlement.
Bids further apart in equilibrium signify greater uncertainty of the arbitrator's preferences
over ideal outcomes.

2.2.3. Implications

The above model implies a tradeo for both insurer and provider when deciding what to
oer. A more extreme bid (e.g., a very low bid from the insurer or a very high bid from the
provider) increases the amount of money the player gets if their oer is selected, however
it reduces the probability of having the oer selected.

This is because the probability of

winning is a function of both the insurer's oer as well as the provider's oer.

A more

extreme bids means more money if one prevails, but a lower probability of prevailing. In
this sense, the strategic tradeos are reminiscent of a sealed bid, rst price auction.

In the stylized model, I show that when one assumes insurers and providers are equally
informed about the noisiness of arbitration, one can derive the structural distribution of
arbitrator preferences.

F (·)

Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984) show that when one assumes that

is a normal distribution, the parameters of this distribution

µ

and

σ

which govern the

arbitrator's preferences can be estimated from a series of nal oers as well as indicators
for which of the two is chosen.

A probit function can recover the two parameters.

In a

number of non-health papers (e.g., Ashenfelter et al. (2013)), these structural parameters
are estimated using data from real-world arbitration cases. Although I have collected and
continue to collect data to allow me to estimate these structural parameters, in the interest of
policy as well as given constraints on my other research, I do not present structural estimates
of arbitrator preferences here. However, I have both published and in-progress descriptive
work presenting stylized facts from actual state-level surprise bill arbitration proceedings.
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In the following section, I introduce these stylized facts originating from state-level data on
surprise medical bill arbitration disputes.

2.3. Data
I collect data on nal-oer arbitration disputes from New York, New Jersey, Texas, and
Washington State to understand the real-world implications of nal-oer arbitration over
surprise medical bills.

From these descriptive studies, I present three stylized facts: (A)

that the guidance provided to arbitrators which anchors the distribution of their idealized
settlements plays a major role in arbitration outcomes, (B) that arbitrator competition
(a hypothesis that dates to the early literature on FOA) is an important policy choice
that is correlated with outcomes which reect market forces, and (C) that uncertainty in
this setting is favorable as it drives incentives towards low-cost settlement as opposed to
high-cost arbitration with potential welfare transfers from patients and disputing parties to
arbitrators, who may nonetheless be providing a valuable service.

2.3.1. Stylized Fact 1: Information Given to Arbitrators Matters

In New York and New Jersey, arbitrators are presented with information to aide their decisions which anchors their decisions to the 80th percentile of charges.

My earlier work

(Chartock et al., 2021) shows that in New Jersey, where arbitrators are presented with
charges to aide in forming judgment (but not negotiated rates), the median decisions tracks
closely with the charges benchmark and is 5.7 times the prevailing in-network rate for the
same services at the median. Unpublished data from New York suggests similar conclusions.

In contrast, in Texas and Washington, where arbitrators are presented with median innetwork negotiated rates, I nd that arbitration outcomes reect the negotiated rates (ongoing work with the same co-authors as above).

There are a number of reasons this stylized fact is important. Firstly, arbitration results tied
to charges may lead to perverse economic incentives. Because charges are unilaterally set by
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providers, if out-of-network providers have enough leverage, they could unilaterally manipulate these charge benchmarks and adjust the disagreement payo in network negotiations.
It is theoretically possible that charges-based arbitration rulings could lead to inationary
health care prices.

In contrast, if the goal of the social planner is to bring the market

into the dispute, allowing the arbitrator to incorporate

negotiated rates

in their decisions,

such as Washington State and Texas does, may result in more optimal outcomes. The

Surprises Act

No

dictates this procedure.

2.3.2. Stylized Fact 2: Arbitrator Competition

The second stylized fact is that in Texas and Washington State, there is free entry into the
market for providing arbitration services. In these states, arbitrators simply must need to be
certied by the state and pass conicts, and they can post their service announcement and
name their own prices to resolve disputes. Ashenfelter and other early authors suggest that
competition among arbitrators to be selected creates a pressure for arbitrators to remain fair
and equal; in the long run, if an arbitrator is systematically favoring one party or another,
he or she will not be selected by both parties (who must agree) to resolve the dispute. This
notion is termed the arbitrator exchangeablity hypothesis.

This does not hold in New

York and New Jersey, where the arbitrators are selected as entities by the state for longterm contracts. My own ongoing work suggests that this creates a principal-agent problem in
which arbitrators who are on long-term contracts (and thus do not face an incentive to exert
high-eort in resolving thorny disputes) may substitute away from delivering high-eort
services towards low-eort services in resolving these disputes.

2.3.3. Stylized Fact 3: Uncertainty and Settlement

Finally, a lingering policy question as of the writing of this paper is the extent to which
adjudicated arbitration under the federal

No Surprises Act

will be relied upon: will insurers

and providers simply learn to expect what will result under arbitration or will there be many
cases? Since the law went into eect only January 1 of this year, there is no data available
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to examine longitudinal trends. However, theory can substitute for data here: Farber (1980)
introduces the notion that there is a contract zone of settlements that are equally as agreeable
to the parties as the arbitrated outcome. The more

uncertain

arbitration outcomes are, the

greater incentive for risk-averse parties to settle beforehand. The analogy is to courtroom
cases  uncertain jury outcomes are strong incentives to plainti and defendant to settle.
Ongoing legal challenges to the

No Surprises Act

focus on a metric called the Qualifying

Payment Amount (QPA), which guidance from Health and Human Services suggests should
be the presumed starting point for arbitrators. The stronger this anchor, the more certain
arbitration outcomes will be, and the lower the incentive for the two parties to settle.

2.4. Conclusion
In this short paper, I introduced a formal model of nal-oer arbitration (developed by
Farber) and applied it to a setting where it has previously not been applied: disputes over
surprise medical bills. With the onset of the

No Surprises Act, arbitration over these medical

bills may yet be a new frontier in health economics. Future work will expand on a number
of questions introduced and raised in this chapter and may rely on exploiting variation
across states with dierent policies, across arbitrators through random assignment of sets of
arbitrators considered, or other strategies. However, the basic model of nal-oer arbitration
introduces the key tradeo the two disputing parties face: a more extreme oer results in
more prot if that oer is selected, but lowers the probability of having that oer selected.
When both parties play this game, the incentives are such that nal-oer arbitration may
have the intended eect of addressing the information problem of surprise, out-of-network
medical bills. More work in this area, both theoretical and empirical, is warranted.
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APPENDIX

Appendix

Example of Provider Quality Score Disclosure and Survey Questions
This gure shows an artistic rendition of what a new patient would see when he or she visited
the health system's website to search for a new provider after November 2, 2018. Note the
4.6 out of 5 (ratings rounded to the nearest one-tenth) and N=418 ratings, along with the
gold stars.

The regression discontinuity design captures the causal eect of increasing a

provider's score by exploiting the rounding of raw averages to discrete binned intervals.
Prior to disclosure, the website looked the same, but without the star ratings.
Figure A1: Sample Physician Rating Webpage

Survey Questions:

1. Did this provider explain things in a way that was easy to understand?

80

2. Did this provider listen carefully to you?

3. Did this provider give you easy to understand instructions about taking care of these
health problems or concerns?

4. Did this provider seem to know the important information about your medical history?

5. Did this provider show respect for what you had to say?

6. Did this provider spend enough time with you?

7. Using any number from 0 to 10, where 0 is the worst provider possible and 10 is the
best provider possible, what number would you use to rate this provider?
Figure A2: Relationship Between Benets and Costs of Waiting
V

v2
v1
c
v1 · e−d1 t
v2 · e−d2 t
v1 · e−d2 t
t̂2

wait time

t̂1
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These gures show the RD separately for each distinct rounding threshold in the rating scale
(See Table 1.3 for pooled regression with cuto xed eects), restricting to the majority of
providers with displayed ratings of 4.6 and up.

Separate best t lines are tted for each

Panel (A) shows the relationship between rating and new visit volume before information
was disclosed, and Panel (B) shows the relationship after disclosure. Vertical lines indicate
rounding thresholds.
Figure A3:
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Figure A4:
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Figure A5:

Figure A6: Manipulation Testing Plot

Note: Density test of the running variable, keeping providermonth observations
with more than one displayed rating per month
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Figure A7: Manipulation Testing Plot

Note: Density test of the running variable, dropping providermonth observations
with more than one displayed rating per month
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Figure A8: Demand Response to Quality Disclosure

Binned scatterplot, data restricted to family medicine physicians, but not dropping observations with more than one displayed rating per month. Compare to Fig. 3 which drops
panel observations displaying more than one rating per month.
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Figure A9: Covariate Balance on Baseline Regression (ProviderMonth Panel)
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Table A.1: Monlthy New Visits, by Count of Family Medicine Providers
(1)
Low Count
Rounded Up

3.363

∗∗

(1.353)
Distance to threshold

Dist

×

Rounded

Cuto FEs
Mean below threshold

∗

-57.36

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Medium Count

High Count

Low Count

High Count

4.788

0.877

2.651

2.330

(4.742)

(2.658)

(1.981)

(1.738)

-74.48

-3.390

-45.84

-10.62

(31.46)

(72.15)

(47.96)

(39.25)

(35.83)

24.08

10.04

-119.7

48.59

-68.73

(56.52)

(194.4)

(77.13)

(85.11)

(60.16)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

88

5.625

6.609

5.798

5.370

6.145

% Change

59.8

72.4

15.1

49.4

37.9

R-squared

0.140

0.375

0.204

0.137

0.143

Observations

1750

231

594

1365

1210

Note: Standard Errors clustered at the provider level and observations weighted by review count. Columns 1-3
compute physician counts using all physicians included in the Area Health Resource File, while columns 4-5
use only the health system's physicians. Model includes cuto FEs
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Table A.2: DeNovo = No, New Visits - Family Medicine
(1)

(2)

Linear

∗∗

Rounded Up

Distance to threshold

×

Quadratic

∗∗

2.070

2.063

(0.880)

(0.873)

-35.72

∗∗

(14.99)
Dist

(3)

∗∗

(4)

Cubic

∗∗∗

3.418

(1.112)

∗∗

-35.28

-92.27

(14.59)

(40.46)

Rounded

Cuto FEs
Mean below threshold

(5)

Linear

∗∗

2.059

Quadratic

∗∗∗

3.954

(6)
Cubic

∗∗∗

4.917

(0.870)

(1.269)

(1.679)

-26.25

-108.6

(17.75)

(96.48)

(163.5)

-17.94

-64.90

186.0

∗∗

-330.8

(33.11)

(136.2)

(273.6)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

3.454

3.454

3.454

3.454

3.454

3.454

% Change

59.9

59.7

99.0

59.6

114.5

142.4

Observations

2730

2730

2730

2730

2730

2730

Note: Standard Errors clustered at the provider level and observations weighted by review count.
Columns 1-3 parameterize same slope on both sides of disconinuity, 4-6 do not.
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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Table A.3: DeNovo = Yes, New Visits - Family Medicine

Rounded Up

Distance to threshold

Dist

×

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Linear

Quadratic

Cubic

Linear

Quadratic

Cubic

0.908

0.895

0.432

0.896

0.333

0.633

(0.647)

(0.641)

(0.581)

(0.641)

(0.625)

(1.000)

-10.11

-9.399

10.10

-0.665

-20.15

-69.12

(8.905)

(8.585)

(21.78)

(9.496)

(45.84)

(82.79)

-17.91

85.54

122.1

Rounded

Cuto FEs
Mean below threshold

(17.81)

(79.51)

(220.3)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

2.021

2.021

2.021

2.021

2.021

2.021

% Change

44.9

44.3

21.4

44.4

16.5

31.3

Observations

2730

2730

2730

2730

2730

2730

Note: Standard Errors clustered at the provider level and observations weighted by review count.
Columns 1-3 parameterize same slope on both sides of disconinuity, 4-6 do not.
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Table A.4: Residualized new Patient Wait Days Local Linear Regression Optimal Bandwidths
False Discontinuity

False Discontinuity

0.025
Pre
Post

-0.025
Pre
Post

True Discontinuity
Pre

0.000
Post

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

2.006

1.941

0.225

-1.452

-0.906

(1.375)

(1.376)

(0.968)

(1.168)

(0.786)

(0.859)

MSE-Optimal Bandwidth

0.007

0.007

0.006

0.008

0.018

0.019

Mean Below Threshold

7.499

7.319

7.426

6.890

9.203

8.703

RD_Estimate

% Change
Observations

Note: Regressions denoted

Pre

(6)

∗∗∗

2.450

26.8

26.5

3.0

-21.1

-9.8

28.1

25643

16760

25643

16760

25643

16760

corresponds to before quality disclosure and

Post

corresponds to after

disclosure. This table reports the regression discontinuity estimate from optimal bandwidth local linear
regression using the

rdrobust

package in Stata (Colonico, et. al. 2017). Left hand side variable

RD_Estimate is a residualized wait time in days for a new patient visits for adults not going to walk-in
clinics. The outcome is residualized prior to estimation with an OLS regression with cutto-specic
and presenting diagnosis specic xed eects (e.g., Lee, 2010) and standard errors are HC0 robust.
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Monthly New Visits - Family Medicine
(1)
Rounded Up

2.192

Functional Form:

(2)

∗∗

(3)

∗∗

(4)

∗∗

(5)

∗∗

(6)

∗

∗

2.163

2.445

2.157

2.563

2.861

(1.104)

(1.093)

(1.212)

(1.089)

(1.346)

(1.647)

Linear

Quad.

Cubic

Linear

Quad.

Cubic

Treatment Interaction

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Cuto FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

5.725

5.725

5.725

5.725

5.725

5.725

2941

2941

2941

2941

2941

2941

Mean Below Threshold
% Change
Observations

Note: Standard Errors clustered at the provider level and observations weighted by review
count. Treatment Interaction refers to an indicator permitting dierent slopes on each side
of the discontinuty. Sample does not exclude providers who display more than 1 rating/month.
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Table A.6: Covariate Balancing:

Rounded Up

Functional Form:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

MD Credential

Male Provider

High Density

Elapsed Tenure

-0.134

-0.0577

-0.0930

-3.319

(0.104)

(0.121)

(0.117)

(2.078)

Linear

Linear

Linear

Linear

Treatment Interaction

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Cuto FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Mean Below Threshold

0.636

0.456

0.558

13.377

% Change

-21.1

-12.6

-16.7

-24.8

Observations

2730

2637

2575

2730

Note: Standard Errors clustered at the provider level and observations weighted by review
count. Treatment Interaction refers to an indicator permitting dierent slopes on each side
of the discontinuty.
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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Table A.7: Monthly New Visits - Family Medicine
(1)
Rounded Up

3.333

Functional Form:

(2)

∗∗

(3)

∗∗

(4)

∗∗

(5)

∗∗

(6)

∗

∗∗

3.306

3.180

3.306

3.349

4.982

(1.410)

(1.406)

(1.611)

(1.404)

(1.823)

(2.514)

Linear

Quad.

Cubic

Linear

Quad.

Cubic

Treatment Interaction

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Cuto FEs

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

5.475

5.475

5.475

5.475

5.475

5.475

Mean Below Threshold
% Change

60.9

60.4

58.1

60.4

61.2

91.0

Observations

2730

2730

2730

2730

2730

2730

Note: Standard Errors clustered at the provider level and observations weighted by review
count. Treatment Interaction refers to an indicator permitting dierent slopes on each side
of the discontinuty.
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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